Ben Blumson
Biographic Data
| ID | 1111802 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Ben Blumson |
| GIVEN NAMES | Ben |
| FAMILY NAME | Blumson |
| SIGNATURE | BEN BLUMSON |
| AFFILIATIONS | National University of Singapore |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-2469-3150 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 6 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 8 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2009 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Love and Fission
labore et dolore magna aliquyam erat, sed diam
Dialetheism and distributed sorites
Relevance and Verification
A. J. Ayer’s empiricist criterion of meaning was supposed to have sorted all statements into nonsense on the one hand, and tautologies or genuinely factual statements on the other. Unfortunately for Ayer, it follows from classical logic that his criterion is trivial—it classifies all statements as either tautologies or genuinely factual, but none as nonsense. However, in this paper, I argue that Ayer’s criterion of meaning can be defended from cl…
Two Conceptions of Similarity
There are at least two traditional conceptions of numerical degree of similarity. According to the first, the degree of dissimilarity between two particulars is their distance apart in a metric space. According to the second, the degree of similarity between two particulars is a function of the number of (sparse) properties they have in common and not in common. This paper argues that these two conceptions are logically independent, but philosoph…
A Syncretistic Theory of Depiction
In A Syncretistic Theory of Depiction, Alberto Voltolini argues for a synthesis of the resemblance and seeing-in theories of depiction. Voltolini’s theory is encapsulated in the following analysis: An item P depicts a subject O, where O can be either a particular individual or any individual of a certain kind, iff (i) one has a certain seeing-in state involving P whose configurational fold grasps the grouping properties that P roughly shares with…
Mental Maps 1
It’s often hypothesized that the structure of mental representation is map‐like rather than language‐like. The possibility arises as a counterexample to the argument from the best explanation of productivity and systematicity to the language of thought hypothesis—the hypothesis that mental structure is compositional and recursive. In this paper, I argue that the analogy with maps does not undermine the argument, because maps and language have the…
Images, Intentionality and Inexistence 1
The possibilities of depicting non‐existents, depicting non‐particulars and depictive misrepresentation are frequently cited as grounds for denying the platitude that depiction is mediated by resemblance. I first argue that these problems are really a manifestation of the more general problem of intentionality. I then show how there is a plausible solution to the general problem of intentionality which is consonant with the platitude
Defining Depiction
Journal Article Defining Depiction Get access Ben Blumson Ben Blumson Ben Blumson,National University of Singapore [email protected] Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The British Journal of Aesthetics, Volume 49, Issue 2, April 2009, Pages 143–157, https://doi.org/10.1093/aesthj/ayp003 Published: 01 April 2009
Mental Maps 1
It’s often hypothesized that the structure of mental representation is map‐like rather than language‐like. The possibility arises as a counterexample to the argument from the best explanation of productivity and systematicity to the language of thought hypothesis—the hypothesis that mental structure is compositional and recursive. In this paper, I argue that the analogy with maps does not undermine the argument, because maps and language have the…
Defining Depiction
Journal Article Defining Depiction Get access Ben Blumson Ben Blumson Ben Blumson,National University of Singapore [email protected] Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The British Journal of Aesthetics, Volume 49, Issue 2, April 2009, Pages 143–157, https://doi.org/10.1093/aesthj/ayp003 Published: 01 April 2009
Two Conceptions of Similarity
There are at least two traditional conceptions of numerical degree of similarity. According to the first, the degree of dissimilarity between two particulars is their distance apart in a metric space. According to the second, the degree of similarity between two particulars is a function of the number of (sparse) properties they have in common and not in common. This paper argues that these two conceptions are logically independent, but philosoph…
Images, Intentionality and Inexistence 1
The possibilities of depicting non‐existents, depicting non‐particulars and depictive misrepresentation are frequently cited as grounds for denying the platitude that depiction is mediated by resemblance. I first argue that these problems are really a manifestation of the more general problem of intentionality. I then show how there is a plausible solution to the general problem of intentionality which is consonant with the platitude
Defining Depiction
Journal Article Defining Depiction Get access Ben Blumson Ben Blumson Ben Blumson,National University of Singapore [email protected] Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The British Journal of Aesthetics, Volume 49, Issue 2, April 2009, Pages 143–157, https://doi.org/10.1093/aesthj/ayp003 Published: 01 April 2009
Mental Maps 1
It’s often hypothesized that the structure of mental representation is map‐like rather than language‐like. The possibility arises as a counterexample to the argument from the best explanation of productivity and systematicity to the language of thought hypothesis—the hypothesis that mental structure is compositional and recursive. In this paper, I argue that the analogy with maps does not undermine the argument, because maps and language have the…
A Syncretistic Theory of Depiction
In A Syncretistic Theory of Depiction, Alberto Voltolini argues for a synthesis of the resemblance and seeing-in theories of depiction. Voltolini’s theory is encapsulated in the following analysis: An item P depicts a subject O, where O can be either a particular individual or any individual of a certain kind, iff (i) one has a certain seeing-in state involving P whose configurational fold grasps the grouping properties that P roughly shares with…
Two Conceptions of Similarity
There are at least two traditional conceptions of numerical degree of similarity. According to the first, the degree of dissimilarity between two particulars is their distance apart in a metric space. According to the second, the degree of similarity between two particulars is a function of the number of (sparse) properties they have in common and not in common. This paper argues that these two conceptions are logically independent, but philosoph…
Relevance and Verification
A. J. Ayer’s empiricist criterion of meaning was supposed to have sorted all statements into nonsense on the one hand, and tautologies or genuinely factual statements on the other. Unfortunately for Ayer, it follows from classical logic that his criterion is trivial—it classifies all statements as either tautologies or genuinely factual, but none as nonsense. However, in this paper, I argue that Ayer’s criterion of meaning can be defended from cl…
Dialetheism and distributed sorites
Love and Fission
labore et dolore magna aliquyam erat, sed diam
Epistemology (6 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Linguistics (4 works) · Depiction (3 works) · Mathematics (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (3 works) · Law (2 works)