Byeong D Lee
Biographic Data
| ID | 1401782 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Byeong D Lee |
| GIVEN NAMES | Byeong D |
| FAMILY NAME | Lee |
| SIGNATURE | LEE B D |
| AFFILIATIONS | Sungkyunkwan University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-7080-6702 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 17 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 5 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 17 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2002 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Are Normative Explanatory Reasons Fundamentally Distinct from Normative Justificatory Reasons? A Critique of Logins’s Erotetic View of Reasons
On Logins’s Erotetic View of reasons, normative reasons are the possible appropriate answers to normative ‘Why?’ questions. These questions can be interpreted in two ways: as requiring either an argument/reasoning or an explanation. Consequently, this view posits not only normative reasoning reasons but also normative explanatory reasons. Against this view, this paper argues for two claims. First, putative normative explanatory reasons are not fu…
The epistemic ought-implies-can principle and the ‘can’ of freedom
On the epistemic ought-implies-can principle, we have an epistemic duty to believe a proposition only if we can believe it. Whether or not this principle holds depends crucially on how to understand the ‘can’ here. The goal of this paper is to offer a new interpretation on which the ‘can’ is best understood as the ‘can’ of freedom, based on a Kantian account of freedom. This new interpretation has important merits compared with the two most promi…
Gertler's acquaintance approach to introspective knowledge and internalist requirements for reasons
Gertler argues that, in some introspective judgments about experience, phenomenal reality intersects with one's grasp of that reality to the effect that one can have knowledge by acquaintance. This new version of the acquaintance theory depends on the idea that some introspective judgments about experience can be justified by the fact that the phenomenal property of an experience is a component of the introspective judgment about the experience. …
The Manipulation Argument and a Kantian account of freedom
On Kant's view, we are rational beings who are morally responsible for our actions. The main goal of this paper is to show that this Kantian view of ourselves is not undermined by the Manipulation Argument, which is currently the biggest challenge to compatibilism. To this end, I argue that a Kantian account of freedom offers a new soft‐line reply to this argument. On this Kantian account, moral responsibility requires not only positive freedom b…
A Leibnizian Antirealist Account of Fictional Characters
Alberto Voltolini advocates a syncretistic account of fictional entities, asserting that it satisfies all the desiderata for a suitable account of fictional entities. This article presents an alternative account of fictional characters that meets these criteria, while circumventing the problems with Voltolini's account. On my Leibnizian antirealist account, a fictional character can be identified by the collection of predicates attributed to its …
The Authority and Content of Morality
Levine on Brandom’s Account of Objectivity
On Brandom’s view, we can understand objectivity in terms of the view that what is objectively correct potentially transcends any given attitude. But Levine challenges this view. He distinguishes between two questions of objectivity: ‘How do we grasp the concept of objectivity?’ and ‘What determines the difference between what is correct and what is merely taken to be correct?’ And he argues that Brandom’s account of objectivity fails to address …
Gupta on Sellars’s Theory of Perception
Recently, Anil Gupta raised several important objections against Wilfrid Sellars’s theory of perception. The purpose of this paper is to defend Sellars’s theory of perception against these objections. I admit that some aspects of his theory are problematic: for example, there are good reasons to reject Sellars’s view that the ultimate referent of a perceptual taking is a sense impression. Nonetheless, I argue that a Sellarsian account of percepti…
The Moral Law as a Fact of Reason and Correctness Conditions for the Moral Law
In the second Critique, Kant claims that the moral law is given as a fact of reason. In this paper, contra the standard view, I argue that there is a non-dogmatic way of defending this claim. And Kant’s principle of morality is widely taken to be a formal principle. How then can such a formal principle be reconciled with our substantial moral end? In this paper, I also argue that Kant’s principle of morality can be construed as a formal principle…
Kitcher’s Explanatory Demand and the Appropriate-Means Requirement on Successful Action
The most important challenge to the deflationary views of truth is the success argument. Kitcher defends this argument by demanding that a proper account of successful action should explain why one and the same action can be not only psychologically pertinent but also effectively pertinent, and by arguing that correspondence truth is required to meet this explanatory demand. In this paper, I argue that a proper account of successful action should…
BonJour's Way Out of the Sellarsian Dilemma and his Explanatory Account
BonJour claims that he has found a way out of the Sellarsian dilemma. In this paper, I argue for three claims to show that his alleged solution fails. First, there are two requirements for being a good reason, and BonJour's notion of non-conceptual awareness of sensory experience faces a serious dilemma with regard to these requirements. Second, he derives his idea of the so-called "constitutive awareness of content" from his conception of consci…
A Constructivist Solution to the Problem of Induction
Ever since Hume raised the problem of induction, many philosophers have tried to solve this problem; however, there still is no solution that has won wide acceptance among philosophers. According to Wilfrid Sellars, the reason is mainly that these philosophers have tried to justify induction by theoretical reasoning rather than by practical reasoning. In this paper I offer a sort of Sellarsian proposal. On the basis of the instrumental principle …
A Pragmatic Phenomenalist Account of Knowledge
Robert Brandom argues for a "pragmatic phenomenalist account" of knowledge. On this account, we should understand our notion of justification in accordance with a Sellarsian social practice model, and there is nothing more to the phenomenon of knowledge than the proprieties of takings-as-knowing. I agree with these two claims. But Brandom's proposal is so sketchy that it is unclear how it can deal with a number of much-discussed problems in conte…
On Davidson's Semantic Anti-Sceptical Argument
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Finkelstein on the Distinction between Conscious and Unconscious Belief
In a recent article, D. H. Finkelstein offers a new proposal about the distinction between conscious and unconscious belief. On his proposal, someone's belief is conscious if he has an ability to express it simply by self-ascribing it; and someone's belief is unconscious if he lacks such an ability. In this article, I argue that his proposal is inadequate, and then offer a somewhat different proposal. On my proposal, someone's belief is conscious…
Davidson's Slingshot Argument Revisited
Utilisant ce qu'on appelle l'argument du lance-pierres, Davidson soutient que la théorie correspondantiste de la vériteé est intenable. Cet argument dépend de deux présuppositions, dont l'une est qu'une phrase vraie ne devrait pas, par substitution de termes singuliers coréférentiels, en venir à correspondre à quelque chose de différent. Je propose dans cet article un argument nouveau pour montrer que cette supposition n'est pas plausible, partic…
Shoemaker on Second-Order Belief and Self-Deception
L'autorité de la première personne au sujet de ses propres états mentaux semble entrer en conflit avec l'occurrence de certaines illusions sur soi-même. Sydney Shoemaker avance une suggestion intéressante pour régler ce type de conflit. Selon cette suggestion, on peut expliquer l'autorité de la première personne au sujet de ses propres états mentaux en maintenant que les croyances positives de second ordre sont toujours correctes, tandis qu'on pe…
A Pragmatic Phenomenalist Account of Knowledge
Robert Brandom argues for a "pragmatic phenomenalist account" of knowledge. On this account, we should understand our notion of justification in accordance with a Sellarsian social practice model, and there is nothing more to the phenomenon of knowledge than the proprieties of takings-as-knowing. I agree with these two claims. But Brandom's proposal is so sketchy that it is unclear how it can deal with a number of much-discussed problems in conte…
BonJour's Way Out of the Sellarsian Dilemma and his Explanatory Account
BonJour claims that he has found a way out of the Sellarsian dilemma. In this paper, I argue for three claims to show that his alleged solution fails. First, there are two requirements for being a good reason, and BonJour's notion of non-conceptual awareness of sensory experience faces a serious dilemma with regard to these requirements. Second, he derives his idea of the so-called "constitutive awareness of content" from his conception of consci…
Finkelstein on the Distinction between Conscious and Unconscious Belief
In a recent article, D. H. Finkelstein offers a new proposal about the distinction between conscious and unconscious belief. On his proposal, someone's belief is conscious if he has an ability to express it simply by self-ascribing it; and someone's belief is unconscious if he lacks such an ability. In this article, I argue that his proposal is inadequate, and then offer a somewhat different proposal. On my proposal, someone's belief is conscious…
Shoemaker on Second-Order Belief and Self-Deception
L'autorité de la première personne au sujet de ses propres états mentaux semble entrer en conflit avec l'occurrence de certaines illusions sur soi-même. Sydney Shoemaker avance une suggestion intéressante pour régler ce type de conflit. Selon cette suggestion, on peut expliquer l'autorité de la première personne au sujet de ses propres états mentaux en maintenant que les croyances positives de second ordre sont toujours correctes, tandis qu'on pe…
Davidson's Slingshot Argument Revisited
Utilisant ce qu'on appelle l'argument du lance-pierres, Davidson soutient que la théorie correspondantiste de la vériteé est intenable. Cet argument dépend de deux présuppositions, dont l'une est qu'une phrase vraie ne devrait pas, par substitution de termes singuliers coréférentiels, en venir à correspondre à quelque chose de différent. Je propose dans cet article un argument nouveau pour montrer que cette supposition n'est pas plausible, partic…
Shoemaker on Second-Order Belief and Self-Deception
L'autorité de la première personne au sujet de ses propres états mentaux semble entrer en conflit avec l'occurrence de certaines illusions sur soi-même. Sydney Shoemaker avance une suggestion intéressante pour régler ce type de conflit. Selon cette suggestion, on peut expliquer l'autorité de la première personne au sujet de ses propres états mentaux en maintenant que les croyances positives de second ordre sont toujours correctes, tandis qu'on pe…
Finkelstein on the Distinction between Conscious and Unconscious Belief
In a recent article, D. H. Finkelstein offers a new proposal about the distinction between conscious and unconscious belief. On his proposal, someone's belief is conscious if he has an ability to express it simply by self-ascribing it; and someone's belief is unconscious if he lacks such an ability. In this article, I argue that his proposal is inadequate, and then offer a somewhat different proposal. On my proposal, someone's belief is conscious…
On Davidson's Semantic Anti-Sceptical Argument
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
A Pragmatic Phenomenalist Account of Knowledge
Robert Brandom argues for a "pragmatic phenomenalist account" of knowledge. On this account, we should understand our notion of justification in accordance with a Sellarsian social practice model, and there is nothing more to the phenomenon of knowledge than the proprieties of takings-as-knowing. I agree with these two claims. But Brandom's proposal is so sketchy that it is unclear how it can deal with a number of much-discussed problems in conte…
A Constructivist Solution to the Problem of Induction
Ever since Hume raised the problem of induction, many philosophers have tried to solve this problem; however, there still is no solution that has won wide acceptance among philosophers. According to Wilfrid Sellars, the reason is mainly that these philosophers have tried to justify induction by theoretical reasoning rather than by practical reasoning. In this paper I offer a sort of Sellarsian proposal. On the basis of the instrumental principle …
BonJour's Way Out of the Sellarsian Dilemma and his Explanatory Account
BonJour claims that he has found a way out of the Sellarsian dilemma. In this paper, I argue for three claims to show that his alleged solution fails. First, there are two requirements for being a good reason, and BonJour's notion of non-conceptual awareness of sensory experience faces a serious dilemma with regard to these requirements. Second, he derives his idea of the so-called "constitutive awareness of content" from his conception of consci…
Kitcher’s Explanatory Demand and the Appropriate-Means Requirement on Successful Action
The most important challenge to the deflationary views of truth is the success argument. Kitcher defends this argument by demanding that a proper account of successful action should explain why one and the same action can be not only psychologically pertinent but also effectively pertinent, and by arguing that correspondence truth is required to meet this explanatory demand. In this paper, I argue that a proper account of successful action should…
The Moral Law as a Fact of Reason and Correctness Conditions for the Moral Law
In the second Critique, Kant claims that the moral law is given as a fact of reason. In this paper, contra the standard view, I argue that there is a non-dogmatic way of defending this claim. And Kant’s principle of morality is widely taken to be a formal principle. How then can such a formal principle be reconciled with our substantial moral end? In this paper, I also argue that Kant’s principle of morality can be construed as a formal principle…
Gupta on Sellars’s Theory of Perception
Recently, Anil Gupta raised several important objections against Wilfrid Sellars’s theory of perception. The purpose of this paper is to defend Sellars’s theory of perception against these objections. I admit that some aspects of his theory are problematic: for example, there are good reasons to reject Sellars’s view that the ultimate referent of a perceptual taking is a sense impression. Nonetheless, I argue that a Sellarsian account of percepti…
Levine on Brandom’s Account of Objectivity
On Brandom’s view, we can understand objectivity in terms of the view that what is objectively correct potentially transcends any given attitude. But Levine challenges this view. He distinguishes between two questions of objectivity: ‘How do we grasp the concept of objectivity?’ and ‘What determines the difference between what is correct and what is merely taken to be correct?’ And he argues that Brandom’s account of objectivity fails to address …
The Authority and Content of Morality
The Manipulation Argument and a Kantian account of freedom
On Kant's view, we are rational beings who are morally responsible for our actions. The main goal of this paper is to show that this Kantian view of ourselves is not undermined by the Manipulation Argument, which is currently the biggest challenge to compatibilism. To this end, I argue that a Kantian account of freedom offers a new soft‐line reply to this argument. On this Kantian account, moral responsibility requires not only positive freedom b…
A Leibnizian Antirealist Account of Fictional Characters
Alberto Voltolini advocates a syncretistic account of fictional entities, asserting that it satisfies all the desiderata for a suitable account of fictional entities. This article presents an alternative account of fictional characters that meets these criteria, while circumventing the problems with Voltolini's account. On my Leibnizian antirealist account, a fictional character can be identified by the collection of predicates attributed to its …
Are Normative Explanatory Reasons Fundamentally Distinct from Normative Justificatory Reasons? A Critique of Logins’s Erotetic View of Reasons
On Logins’s Erotetic View of reasons, normative reasons are the possible appropriate answers to normative ‘Why?’ questions. These questions can be interpreted in two ways: as requiring either an argument/reasoning or an explanation. Consequently, this view posits not only normative reasoning reasons but also normative explanatory reasons. Against this view, this paper argues for two claims. First, putative normative explanatory reasons are not fu…
The epistemic ought-implies-can principle and the ‘can’ of freedom
On the epistemic ought-implies-can principle, we have an epistemic duty to believe a proposition only if we can believe it. Whether or not this principle holds depends crucially on how to understand the ‘can’ here. The goal of this paper is to offer a new interpretation on which the ‘can’ is best understood as the ‘can’ of freedom, based on a Kantian account of freedom. This new interpretation has important merits compared with the two most promi…
Gertler's acquaintance approach to introspective knowledge and internalist requirements for reasons
Gertler argues that, in some introspective judgments about experience, phenomenal reality intersects with one's grasp of that reality to the effect that one can have knowledge by acquaintance. This new version of the acquaintance theory depends on the idea that some introspective judgments about experience can be justified by the fact that the phenomenal property of an experience is a component of the introspective judgment about the experience. …
Philosophy (15 works) · Epistemology (13 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (12 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (12 works) · Free Will and Agency (6 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (5 works) · Psychology (5 works) · Argument (complex analysis) (4 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Law (3 works)