Jonathan Mitchell
Biographic Data
| ID | 3597481 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jonathan Mitchell |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jonathan |
| FAMILY NAME | Mitchell |
| SIGNATURE | MITCHELL J |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Manchester |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-7008-4655 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 32 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 20 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 32 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1935 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
The Sensory Dimension of Episodic Recollection
Episodic recollection often involves some kind of awareness of the sensory features or properties of what is remembered. Episodically recollecting that sunset last summer on the Greek island of Ios, involves some kind of awareness of how it looked, that is its deep blood-red colour. This is suggestive that for those episodic recollections that possess this sensory phenomenology, it is not a mere accompaniment, that is something those types of exp…
High-resolution mapping of shark movements from drone footage at Queensland beaches improves risk assessment for beach safety
Shark interactions with water users can, on rare occasions, lead to shark bites. The sporadic nature of these events and their rarity has complicated efforts to understand the underlying causes, with many contributing factors implicated. Understanding shark presence and movement patterns near beaches is critical to developing a better appraisal of risk for shark bites. Recent advancements in Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV, or drones) technology has…
The phenomenal contribution of attention
Strong or Pure Intentionalism is the view that the phenomenal character of a conscious experience is exhaustively determined by its intentional content. Contrastingly, impure intentionalism holds that there are also non content-based aspects or features which contribute to phenomenal character. Conscious attention is one such feature: arguably its contribution to the phenomenal character of a given conscious experience are not exhaustively captur…
Sartre's Exclusion Claim
In The Imaginary Jean‐Paul Sartre makes what will strike many as an implausibly strong claim, namely that perception and imagination are incompatible kinds of experience ‐ I call this the exclusion claim . This paper offers a reconstruction of Sartre's exclusion claim. First, it frames the claim in terms of cross‐modal attention distribution, such that it is not possible to simultaneously attend to what one is imagining and what one is perceiving…
Towards Affective-Evaluativism
Evaluativism about unpleasant pains offers one way to think about unpleasant pain experience. However, extant Evaluativist views do not pay enough attention to the affective dimension of pain experience and the complex relations between the affective, evaluative and sensory dimensions. This paper clarifies these relations and provides a view which more closely reflects the phenomenology of unpleasant pains. It argues that the intentional structur…
A Nietzschean theory of emotional experience
This paper offers a Nietzschean theory of emotion as expressed by following thesis: paradigmatic emotional experiences exhibit a distinctive kind of affective intentionality, specified in terms of felt valenced attitudes towards the (apparent) evaluative properties of their objects. Emotional experiences, on this Nietzschean view, are therefore fundamentally feelings towards value. This interpretation explains how Nietzschean affects can have eva…
The Horizonal Structure of Visual Experience
How is it that we can visually experience complete three-dimensional objects despite being limited, in any given perceptual moment, to perceiving the sides facing us from a specific spatial perspective? To make sense of this, such visual experiences must refer to occluded or presently unseen back-sides which are not sense-perceptually given, and which cannot be sense-perceptually given while the subject is occupying the spatial perspective on the…
Emotion and attention
This paper first demonstrates that recognition of the diversity of ways that emotional responses modulate ongoing attention generates what I call the puzzle of emotional attention , which turns on the fact that distinct emotions (e.g., fear, happiness, disgust, admiration etc.) have different attentional profiles. The puzzle concerns why this is the case, such that a solution consists in explaining why distinct emotions have the distinct attentio…
Experiencing Mandates
In this paper I focus on a subset of experiences in which action-properties are presented—namely, those in which objects in our perceptual surroundings or environment ‘demand’ that certain actions be carried out, as experienced mandates (EMs). The critical part of the paper argues that a complex contents view, which builds all of the distinctiveness of such experiences into their perceptual content, is unsatisfactory. As an alternative, I argue t…
Two irreducible classes of emotional experiences
A view of prominence in the philosophy of emotion is that emotional experiences are not self‐standing intentional experiences. Instead, they inherit the intentional content they have from their cognitive bases. One implication is that emotions, whose intentional contents differ in terms of the modal and temporal properties of the relevant particular object—because the intentional contents on which they are based differ in these respects—nonethele…
Another Look at Mode Intentionalism
A central claim in contemporary philosophy of mind is that the phenomenal character of experience is entirely determined by its content. This paper considers an alternative called Mode Intentionalism . According to this view, phenomenal character outruns content because the intentional mode contributes to the phenomenal character of the experience. I assess a phenomenal contrast argument in support of this view, arguing that the cases appealed to…
The bodily-attitudinal theory of emotion
This paper provides an assessment of the bodily-attitudinal theory of emotions, according to which emotions are felt bodily attitudes of action readiness. After providing a reconstruction of the view and clarifying its central commitments two objections are considered (absence of bodily phenomenology and what kind of bodily awareness). An alternative object side interpretation of felt action readiness is then provided, which undermines the motiva…
Self-Locating Content in Visual Experience and the "Here-Replacement" Account
According to the Self-Location Thesis, certain types of visual experiences have self-locating and so first-person (or de se), spatial contents. Such self-locating contents are typically specified in relational egocentric terms. So understood, visual experiences provide support for the claim that there is a kind of self-consciousness found in experiential states. This paper critically examines the Self-Location Thesis with respect to dynamic-refle…
Affective shifts
It is a familiar feature of our affective psychology that our moods ‘crystalize’ into emotions, and that our emotions ‘diffuse’ into moods. Providing a detailed philosophical account of these affective shifts, as I will call them, is the central aim of this paper. Drawing on contemporary philosophy of emotion and mood, alongside distinctive ideas from the phenomenologically-inspired writer Robert Musil, a broadly ‘intentional’ and ‘evaluativist’ …
Affective representation and affective attitudes
Many philosophers have understood the representational dimension of affective states along the model of perceptual experiences. This paper argues affective experiences involve a kind of personal level affective representation disanalogous from the representational character of perceptual experiences. The positive thesis is that affective representation is a non-transparent, non-sensory form of evaluative representation, whereby a felt valenced at…
The Mind’s Presence to Itself
According to some philosophers, the mind enjoys a form of presence to itself. That is to say, in addition to being aware of whatever objects it is aware of, it is also (co‐presently) aware of itself. This paper explores the proposal that we should think about this kind of experiential‐presence in terms of a form of non‐intentional awareness. Various candidates for the relevant form of awareness, as constituting supposed non‐intentional experienti…
On the non-conceptual content of affective-evaluative experience
The Attitudinal Opacity of Emotional Experience
According to some philosophers, when introspectively attending to experience, we seem to see right through it to the (apparent) objects outside, including their properties. This is called the transparency of experience. This paper examines whether, and in what sense, emotions are transparent. It argues that emotional experiences are opaque in a distinctive way: introspective attention to them does not principally reveal non-intentional somatic qu…
Pre-emotional Awareness and the Content-Priority View
Much contemporary philosophy of emotion has been in broad agreement about the claim that emotional experiences have evaluative content. This paper assesses a relatively neglected alternative, which I call the content-priority view, according to which emotions are responses to a form of pre-emotional value awareness, as what we are aware of in having certain non-emotional evaluative states which are temporally prior to emotion. I argue that the ce…
A Nietzschean Critique of Metaphysical Philosophy
This article provides a new account of Nietzsche's critique of metaphysical philosophy. After framing Nietzsche's anti-metaphysical project (section 1), I suggest that to understand the logic of his critique we should reconstruct a taxonomy that distinguishes between “rich metaphysics” and “thin metaphysics” (section 2). I then consider Nietzsche's methodological critique of “rich metaphysics,” arguing that his position, which alleges motivationa…
The Empty Child
This essay examines Samuel Delany’s novel, Hogg to interrogate the figure of the innocent child and the role of the family in America, especially in mid-century America. The essay contends that the novel, narrated by the unnamed eleven-year-old protagonist who details both his polymorphously perverse sexual exploits as companion to the eponymous Hogg (outcast, murderer and rapist for hire) and acts also as chronicle of Hogg’s experiences over 72 …
Modeling Sexual Assault Risk Perception Among Heterosexual College Females
This investigation utilizes structural equation modeling (SEM) to build and test a comprehensive model of specific and global risk perception. A sample of 325 undergraduate females responded to measures of previous victimization, problematic alcohol use, and maladaptive coping. They also rated perceived risk in multiple hypothetical dating vignettes. The results revealed strong relationships between problematic alcohol use and both decreased spec…
Nietzschean Self-Overcoming
The aim of this article is to provide a novel reading of Nietzsche's concept of self-overcoming and in doing so draw out some distinctive features of his thinking about ethics and ethical ideals. However this reading will be different from the work of those interpreters who read self-overcoming in terms of Nietzsche's will to power psychology. Rather it attempts to frame self-overcoming as a distinctive kind of re-evaluative, ethical activity. Se…
Nietzsche on Ethics and Politics
The Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche
Comprising thirty-two chapters by thirty-four contributors, divided into six discrete sections, and ending with a subject and names index, The Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche makes a convincing claim to exhaustiveness. Even if the editors, Ken Gemes and John Richardson, admit that “no single volume can hope to cover all of Nietzsche's extremely wide ranging-interests” (1), the Handbook covers most of the conceivable ground and, to this reader at lea…
The Cambridge Atlas of the Middle East and North Africa
Town and Country in Central and Eastern Africa
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. As you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button
Pre-emotional Awareness and the Content-Priority View
Much contemporary philosophy of emotion has been in broad agreement about the claim that emotional experiences have evaluative content. This paper assesses a relatively neglected alternative, which I call the content-priority view, according to which emotions are responses to a form of pre-emotional value awareness, as what we are aware of in having certain non-emotional evaluative states which are temporally prior to emotion. I argue that the ce…
What Public Presence? Access, Commons and Property Rights
The development of a rigorous basis for what it means to be public in rural space depends in large part on the distinctive language and ideas of access and commons. Understandings of rural space that inform policy-making are peculiarly dominated by the rhetorical and political power of private property. It is access and commons that give an opportunity to confront this. The article draws on an example of a challenge by a landowner to the heralded…
Towards Affective-Evaluativism
Evaluativism about unpleasant pains offers one way to think about unpleasant pain experience. However, extant Evaluativist views do not pay enough attention to the affective dimension of pain experience and the complex relations between the affective, evaluative and sensory dimensions. This paper clarifies these relations and provides a view which more closely reflects the phenomenology of unpleasant pains. It argues that the intentional structur…
Affective shifts
It is a familiar feature of our affective psychology that our moods ‘crystalize’ into emotions, and that our emotions ‘diffuse’ into moods. Providing a detailed philosophical account of these affective shifts, as I will call them, is the central aim of this paper. Drawing on contemporary philosophy of emotion and mood, alongside distinctive ideas from the phenomenologically-inspired writer Robert Musil, a broadly ‘intentional’ and ‘evaluativist’ …
Affective representation and affective attitudes
Many philosophers have understood the representational dimension of affective states along the model of perceptual experiences. This paper argues affective experiences involve a kind of personal level affective representation disanalogous from the representational character of perceptual experiences. The positive thesis is that affective representation is a non-transparent, non-sensory form of evaluative representation, whereby a felt valenced at…
On the non-conceptual content of affective-evaluative experience
The Attitudinal Opacity of Emotional Experience
According to some philosophers, when introspectively attending to experience, we seem to see right through it to the (apparent) objects outside, including their properties. This is called the transparency of experience. This paper examines whether, and in what sense, emotions are transparent. It argues that emotional experiences are opaque in a distinctive way: introspective attention to them does not principally reveal non-intentional somatic qu…
The Domesday Geography of Norfolk and Suffolk
p. 213. (Io) 'An Economic Survey of Agriculture in the Eastern Counties of England, 1931' (Heffer, 1932). See also H. H. Nicholson and F. Hanley: Soil Conditions in East Anglia, Empire Jour. Exper. Agric. vol. viii, p. 60. (ii) Carl Stephenson: 'Borough and Town' (1933), p. I98. Note also Stephenson's general discussion of the problems connected, with burgenses. (12) M. D. Lobel: 'The Borough of Bury St. Edmunds' (I935), pp. 0-I15
Town and Country in Central and Eastern Africa
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. As you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button
The Cambridge Atlas of the Middle East and North Africa
The Cambridge Atlas of the Middle East and North Africa
This new Cambridge Atlas is designed as an up-to-date reference source on the whole contemporary Middle East, from Iran to North Africa, with an emphasis on economic and social developments. In 60 pages of two-colour maps, each accompanied by a page of commentary and supplementary figures, the Atlas presents detailed information on the Middle East essential to the international business, political and journalistic community and to a wide range of…
The Cambridge Atlas of the Middle East and North Africa
What Public Presence? Access, Commons and Property Rights
The development of a rigorous basis for what it means to be public in rural space depends in large part on the distinctive language and ideas of access and commons. Understandings of rural space that inform policy-making are peculiarly dominated by the rhetorical and political power of private property. It is access and commons that give an opportunity to confront this. The article draws on an example of a challenge by a landowner to the heralded…
Tourism and Poverty Reduction
Tourism can reduce poverty in developing countries. But tourism growth is not universally inclusive of the poor. Moreover our understanding of how tourism affects the poor is largely based on partial and superficial analysis. Researchers from different disciplines and practitioners with different objectives generally work in splendid isolation from each other and from the mainstream of development economics. Detailed economic analysis remains bur…
The Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche
Comprising thirty-two chapters by thirty-four contributors, divided into six discrete sections, and ending with a subject and names index, The Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche makes a convincing claim to exhaustiveness. Even if the editors, Ken Gemes and John Richardson, admit that “no single volume can hope to cover all of Nietzsche's extremely wide ranging-interests” (1), the Handbook covers most of the conceivable ground and, to this reader at lea…
Modeling Sexual Assault Risk Perception Among Heterosexual College Females
This investigation utilizes structural equation modeling (SEM) to build and test a comprehensive model of specific and global risk perception. A sample of 325 undergraduate females responded to measures of previous victimization, problematic alcohol use, and maladaptive coping. They also rated perceived risk in multiple hypothetical dating vignettes. The results revealed strong relationships between problematic alcohol use and both decreased spec…
Nietzschean Self-Overcoming
The aim of this article is to provide a novel reading of Nietzsche's concept of self-overcoming and in doing so draw out some distinctive features of his thinking about ethics and ethical ideals. However this reading will be different from the work of those interpreters who read self-overcoming in terms of Nietzsche's will to power psychology. Rather it attempts to frame self-overcoming as a distinctive kind of re-evaluative, ethical activity. Se…
Nietzsche on Ethics and Politics
A Nietzschean Critique of Metaphysical Philosophy
This article provides a new account of Nietzsche's critique of metaphysical philosophy. After framing Nietzsche's anti-metaphysical project (section 1), I suggest that to understand the logic of his critique we should reconstruct a taxonomy that distinguishes between “rich metaphysics” and “thin metaphysics” (section 2). I then consider Nietzsche's methodological critique of “rich metaphysics,” arguing that his position, which alleges motivationa…
The Empty Child
This essay examines Samuel Delany’s novel, Hogg to interrogate the figure of the innocent child and the role of the family in America, especially in mid-century America. The essay contends that the novel, narrated by the unnamed eleven-year-old protagonist who details both his polymorphously perverse sexual exploits as companion to the eponymous Hogg (outcast, murderer and rapist for hire) and acts also as chronicle of Hogg’s experiences over 72 …
Pre-emotional Awareness and the Content-Priority View
Much contemporary philosophy of emotion has been in broad agreement about the claim that emotional experiences have evaluative content. This paper assesses a relatively neglected alternative, which I call the content-priority view, according to which emotions are responses to a form of pre-emotional value awareness, as what we are aware of in having certain non-emotional evaluative states which are temporally prior to emotion. I argue that the ce…
On the non-conceptual content of affective-evaluative experience
The Attitudinal Opacity of Emotional Experience
According to some philosophers, when introspectively attending to experience, we seem to see right through it to the (apparent) objects outside, including their properties. This is called the transparency of experience. This paper examines whether, and in what sense, emotions are transparent. It argues that emotional experiences are opaque in a distinctive way: introspective attention to them does not principally reveal non-intentional somatic qu…
The bodily-attitudinal theory of emotion
This paper provides an assessment of the bodily-attitudinal theory of emotions, according to which emotions are felt bodily attitudes of action readiness. After providing a reconstruction of the view and clarifying its central commitments two objections are considered (absence of bodily phenomenology and what kind of bodily awareness). An alternative object side interpretation of felt action readiness is then provided, which undermines the motiva…
Self-Locating Content in Visual Experience and the "Here-Replacement" Account
According to the Self-Location Thesis, certain types of visual experiences have self-locating and so first-person (or de se), spatial contents. Such self-locating contents are typically specified in relational egocentric terms. So understood, visual experiences provide support for the claim that there is a kind of self-consciousness found in experiential states. This paper critically examines the Self-Location Thesis with respect to dynamic-refle…
Affective shifts
It is a familiar feature of our affective psychology that our moods ‘crystalize’ into emotions, and that our emotions ‘diffuse’ into moods. Providing a detailed philosophical account of these affective shifts, as I will call them, is the central aim of this paper. Drawing on contemporary philosophy of emotion and mood, alongside distinctive ideas from the phenomenologically-inspired writer Robert Musil, a broadly ‘intentional’ and ‘evaluativist’ …
Affective representation and affective attitudes
Many philosophers have understood the representational dimension of affective states along the model of perceptual experiences. This paper argues affective experiences involve a kind of personal level affective representation disanalogous from the representational character of perceptual experiences. The positive thesis is that affective representation is a non-transparent, non-sensory form of evaluative representation, whereby a felt valenced at…
The Mind’s Presence to Itself
According to some philosophers, the mind enjoys a form of presence to itself. That is to say, in addition to being aware of whatever objects it is aware of, it is also (co‐presently) aware of itself. This paper explores the proposal that we should think about this kind of experiential‐presence in terms of a form of non‐intentional awareness. Various candidates for the relevant form of awareness, as constituting supposed non‐intentional experienti…
Two irreducible classes of emotional experiences
A view of prominence in the philosophy of emotion is that emotional experiences are not self‐standing intentional experiences. Instead, they inherit the intentional content they have from their cognitive bases. One implication is that emotions, whose intentional contents differ in terms of the modal and temporal properties of the relevant particular object—because the intentional contents on which they are based differ in these respects—nonethele…
Another Look at Mode Intentionalism
A central claim in contemporary philosophy of mind is that the phenomenal character of experience is entirely determined by its content. This paper considers an alternative called Mode Intentionalism . According to this view, phenomenal character outruns content because the intentional mode contributes to the phenomenal character of the experience. I assess a phenomenal contrast argument in support of this view, arguing that the cases appealed to…
Emotion and attention
This paper first demonstrates that recognition of the diversity of ways that emotional responses modulate ongoing attention generates what I call the puzzle of emotional attention , which turns on the fact that distinct emotions (e.g., fear, happiness, disgust, admiration etc.) have different attentional profiles. The puzzle concerns why this is the case, such that a solution consists in explaining why distinct emotions have the distinct attentio…
Experiencing Mandates
In this paper I focus on a subset of experiences in which action-properties are presented—namely, those in which objects in our perceptual surroundings or environment ‘demand’ that certain actions be carried out, as experienced mandates (EMs). The critical part of the paper argues that a complex contents view, which builds all of the distinctiveness of such experiences into their perceptual content, is unsatisfactory. As an alternative, I argue t…
Philosophy (20 works) · Epistemology (19 works) · Psychology (19 works) · Cognitive psychology (13 works) · Social Psychology (12 works) · Computer Science (11 works) · Emotions and Moral Behavior (10 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (10 works) · Perception (9 works) · Linguistics (8 works)