Marco Serena
Biographic Data
| ID | 4386366 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Marco Serena |
| GIVEN NAMES | Marco |
| FAMILY NAME | Serena |
| SIGNATURE | SERENA M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-6215-9629 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 7 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 8 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Fair representation in primaries
In sequential primaries, fair representation of the electorate may be undermined by the New Hampshire effect. Simultaneous primaries address fair representation, as there is no New Hampshire effect, but may increase expenditures. We analyze these issues by studying heterogeneity in sequential and simultaneous contests. The nature of heterogeneity is crucial. If a player is stronger in every battle, then expenditures in sequential contests are sma…
Type-projection, pro-social behavior, and a public good game
R&D contest design with resource allocation and entry fees
Centralized assignment of prizes and contestants
We study a contest design problem in which a designer chooses how many Tullock contests to have, how much to award to each contest, and which contestants (of high or low type) should be assigned to which contest. Our main result is that a single grand contest maximizes total effort. We consider three extensions. First, when the designers’ objective changes to maximizing the effort submitted by the winning contestant, we find that the optimal desi…
An empirical analysis of insistent bargaining
Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size and asymmetric benefits
Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size
We study the equilibria of the standard pivotal-voter participation game between two groups of voters of asymmetric sizes (majority and minority), as originally proposed by Palfrey and Rosenthal (Public Choice 41(1):7–53, 1983). We find a unique equilibrium wherein the minority votes with certainty and the majority votes with probability in (0, 1); we prove that this is the only equilibrium in which voters of only one group play a pure strategy, …
Sequential contests revisited
Sequential contests revisited
Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size
We study the equilibria of the standard pivotal-voter participation game between two groups of voters of asymmetric sizes (majority and minority), as originally proposed by Palfrey and Rosenthal (Public Choice 41(1):7–53, 1983). We find a unique equilibrium wherein the minority votes with certainty and the majority votes with probability in (0, 1); we prove that this is the only equilibrium in which voters of only one group play a pure strategy, …
Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size and asymmetric benefits
An empirical analysis of insistent bargaining
Centralized assignment of prizes and contestants
We study a contest design problem in which a designer chooses how many Tullock contests to have, how much to award to each contest, and which contestants (of high or low type) should be assigned to which contest. Our main result is that a single grand contest maximizes total effort. We consider three extensions. First, when the designers’ objective changes to maximizing the effort submitted by the winning contestant, we find that the optimal desi…
Fair representation in primaries
In sequential primaries, fair representation of the electorate may be undermined by the New Hampshire effect. Simultaneous primaries address fair representation, as there is no New Hampshire effect, but may increase expenditures. We analyze these issues by studying heterogeneity in sequential and simultaneous contests. The nature of heterogeneity is crucial. If a player is stronger in every battle, then expenditures in sequential contests are sma…
Type-projection, pro-social behavior, and a public good game
R&D contest design with resource allocation and entry fees
Economics (7 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (5 works) · Mathematics (5 works) · Microeconomics (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Econometrics (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (3 works) · CONTEST (3 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (3 works)