Adam Perry
Biographic Data
| ID | 4392004 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Adam Perry |
| GIVEN NAMES | Adam |
| FAMILY NAME | Perry |
| SIGNATURE | PERRY A |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Oxford |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0910-870X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 9 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2013 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Judicial Review
In this article we distinguish two questions about judicial review. First, substance: what acts or decisions are properly subject to the grounds of review? Second, procedure: what acts or decisions are properly reviewable through the judicial review procedure? Then we settle both. Our answer to substance is that two principles determine the scope of the grounds of review, the first a principle of regularity, the second a principle of non‐arbitrar…
Precedent and Fairness
Courts in common law systems decide cases as they decided like cases in the past—even if they believe they decided those past cases wrongly. What, if anything, justifies this practice? I defend two main claims. The first is that fairness favors treating like cases alike if that means treating them correctly. The second is that, in general, a court is as likely to decide an instant case correctly as it was to decide a previous and like case correc…
Introduction by the Guest Editors
An abstract is not available for this content. As you have access to this content, full HTML content is provided on this page. A PDF of this content is also available in through the ‘Save PDF’ action button
Wednesbury Unreasonableness
Administrative decisions are unlawful if they are unreasonable, in the sense that Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v Wednesbury Corporation made famous. What is Wednesbury unreasonableness, precisely? Courts have not clearly said, and existing academic answers are flawed. Here I propose a new answer. My claim, roughly, is that a Wednesbury unreasonable decision is one that a court is entitled, given the evidence before it, to conclude wa…
Plainly Wrong
English law and wider common law jurisprudence have endorsed the condition that an appellate court should reject a trial judge's finding of fact which it believes is ‘plainly wrong’. Courts have not explained what makes a finding plainly wrong, however. Scholars have largely ignored the issue. This article draws on recent work in epistemology to provide a new analysis of the plainly wrong standard. Rationally, a court should not believe both (1) …
Law's Boundaries
The norms of a legal system are relevant in deciding on people's rights and duties within that system. Some norms that are not part of a legal system are also relevant within it: norms of foreign legal systems, games, clubs, contracts, grammar, and so on. What distinguishes the norms of a legal system from the norms merely relevant within it? Where, in other words, are law's boundaries? There are three existing answers in the literature, from Kra…
Top‐Down Constitutional Conventions
Many scholars think that all conventions of the constitution emerge from the bottom up, out of the practices of constitutional actors. Here we develop the first systematic account of conventions that are imposed from the top down, through prescriptions by constitutional actors. We show that ‘top‐down conventions’ (as we term them) can be created through the use of normative rule‐making powers; that powers of the right kind are sometimes conferred…
Mercy
Constitutional Conventions and the P rince of W ales
The U pper T ribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber) held in Evans v Information Commissioner that certain correspondence between P rince C harles and government officials must be disclosed under freedom of information legislation. Much of the judgment was devoted to a discussion of the constitutional conventions applicable to P rince C harles, and the case provides a useful example of how conventions and laws can interact. In this note, I argue…
No prominent works on this page.
Constitutional Conventions and the P rince of W ales
The U pper T ribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber) held in Evans v Information Commissioner that certain correspondence between P rince C harles and government officials must be disclosed under freedom of information legislation. Much of the judgment was devoted to a discussion of the constitutional conventions applicable to P rince C harles, and the case provides a useful example of how conventions and laws can interact. In this note, I argue…
Top‐Down Constitutional Conventions
Many scholars think that all conventions of the constitution emerge from the bottom up, out of the practices of constitutional actors. Here we develop the first systematic account of conventions that are imposed from the top down, through prescriptions by constitutional actors. We show that ‘top‐down conventions’ (as we term them) can be created through the use of normative rule‐making powers; that powers of the right kind are sometimes conferred…
Mercy
Law's Boundaries
The norms of a legal system are relevant in deciding on people's rights and duties within that system. Some norms that are not part of a legal system are also relevant within it: norms of foreign legal systems, games, clubs, contracts, grammar, and so on. What distinguishes the norms of a legal system from the norms merely relevant within it? Where, in other words, are law's boundaries? There are three existing answers in the literature, from Kra…
Precedent and Fairness
Courts in common law systems decide cases as they decided like cases in the past—even if they believe they decided those past cases wrongly. What, if anything, justifies this practice? I defend two main claims. The first is that fairness favors treating like cases alike if that means treating them correctly. The second is that, in general, a court is as likely to decide an instant case correctly as it was to decide a previous and like case correc…
Introduction by the Guest Editors
An abstract is not available for this content. As you have access to this content, full HTML content is provided on this page. A PDF of this content is also available in through the ‘Save PDF’ action button
Wednesbury Unreasonableness
Administrative decisions are unlawful if they are unreasonable, in the sense that Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v Wednesbury Corporation made famous. What is Wednesbury unreasonableness, precisely? Courts have not clearly said, and existing academic answers are flawed. Here I propose a new answer. My claim, roughly, is that a Wednesbury unreasonable decision is one that a court is entitled, given the evidence before it, to conclude wa…
Plainly Wrong
English law and wider common law jurisprudence have endorsed the condition that an appellate court should reject a trial judge's finding of fact which it believes is ‘plainly wrong’. Courts have not explained what makes a finding plainly wrong, however. Scholars have largely ignored the issue. This article draws on recent work in epistemology to provide a new analysis of the plainly wrong standard. Rationally, a court should not believe both (1) …
Judicial Review
In this article we distinguish two questions about judicial review. First, substance: what acts or decisions are properly subject to the grounds of review? Second, procedure: what acts or decisions are properly reviewable through the judicial review procedure? Then we settle both. Our answer to substance is that two principles determine the scope of the grounds of review, the first a principle of regularity, the second a principle of non‐arbitrar…
Law (6 works) · Law and economics (6 works) · Political science (6 works) · Sociology (5 works) · Judicial and Constitutional Studies (4 works) · Legal principles and applications (4 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Judicial review (2 works) · Medical Malpractice and Liability Issues (2 works)