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J A Robinson

Biographic Data

ID47066
NAMEJ A Robinson
GIVEN NAMESJ A
FAMILY NAMERobinson
SIGNATUREROBINSON J A
AFFILIATIONSUniversity of Chicago
ORCID0000-0002-8028-0393
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS41
TOTAL CITATIONS1207
AUTHOR COUNT37
EDITOR COUNT4
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1963
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2023
H-INDEX11
  • Inclusive diets within planetary boundaries

    Open Access•Nozomi Kawarazuka, Tafadzwanashe Mabhaudhi et al.•ARTICLE•One Earth•2023

  • Weak, Despotic, or Inclusive? How State Type Emerges from State versus Civil Society Competition

    Open Access•Daron Acemoglu, J A Robinson•ARTICLE•American Political Science Review•2023•Cited by: 11•References: 53

    We develop a theory of the accumulation of state capacity as the outcome of a political competition between elites and (civil) society. State capacity is accumulated by elites, and it is productive as well as useful in controlling society. However, society can fight back and accumulate its own capacity, facilitating collective action. The theory leads to three distinct equilibria depending on initial conditions. One type, a weak state, emerges wh…

  • Non-Modernization

    Open Access•Daron Acemoglu, J A Robinson et al.•ARTICLE•Annual Review of Political Science•2022•Cited by: 6•References: 39

    Modernization theory is a cornerstone of much of political science, despite the mounting evidence against its predictions. We outline a theory in which the distribution of political power critically combines with political culture. We call the basic components of culture “attributes” and argue that these can be combined into larger cultural configurations. These configurations interact with the distribution of power and lead to three distinct sel…

  • Social Origins of Dictatorships

    Open Access•Naidu, Suresh Naidu et al.•ARTICLE•American Political Science Review•2021•Cited by: 15•References: 46

    Existing theories of democratic reversals emphasize that elites mount actions like coups when democracy is particularly threatening to their interests. However, existing theory has been largely silent on the role of elite social networks, which interact with economic incentives and may facilitate antidemocratic collective action. We develop a model where coups generate rents for elites and show that the effort an elite puts into a coup is increas…

  • Response to Sheri Berman’s Review of The Narrow Corridor

    Open Access•Daron Acemoglu, J A Robinson•ARTICLE•Perspectives on Politics•2020

    An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content

  • Democracy Does Cause Growth

    Daron Acemoglu, Naidu et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2018•Cited by: 226•References: 13

    We provide evidence that democracy has a positive effect on GDP per capita. Our dynamic panel strategy controls for country fixed effects and the rich dynamics of GDP, which otherwise confound the effect of democracy. To reduce measurement error, we introduce a new indicator of democracy that consolidates previous measures. Our baseline results show that democratizations increase GDP per capita by about 20 percent in the long run. We find similar…

  • Asymmetric Growth and Institutions in an Interdependent World

    Daron Acemoglu, J A Robinson et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2017•Cited by: 17•References: 11

    We present a model of technologically interconnected countries that benefit and potentially contribute to advances in the world technology frontier. Greater inequality between successful and unsuccessful entrepreneurs increases entrepreneurial effort and a country’s contribution to that frontier. Under plausible assumptions, the world equilibrium is asymmetric, involving different economic institutions and technology levels for different countrie…

  • A Discussion of Josiah Ober’s The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece

    Open Access•Daron Acemoglu, J A Robinson et al.•ARTICLE•Perspectives on Politics•2016

    Ancient Greece has long exercised a powerful hold on the imagination of modern political science. But until fairly recently, this influence has largely been philosophical, related to the origins of many theoretical concepts—including the concept of politics itself—in the ancient world. In The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece , Josiah Ober offers a synoptic and ambitious social theoretical account of the ancient Greek world, the sources of its po…

  • Faire la guerre et faire l 'État

    Steve Pincu, Steve Pincus et al.•ARTICLE•Annales Histoire Sciences Sociales•2016•Cited by: 2•References: 13

    Cet article propose une critique de la pertinence de la notion d'État fiscal-militaire, en se penchant plus particulièrement sur le cas exemplaire de la Grande-Bretagne qui consacra une part significativement moindre des revenus du gouvernement au domaine militaire que tout autre État européen. En outre, il met en lumière d'autres sources de dépenses civiles importantes, notamment l'investissement massif de l'État britannique dans le développemen…

  • Democracy, Redistribution, and Inequality

    Open Access•Daron Acemoglu, Naidu et al.•CHAPTER•Handbook of Income Disribution•2015

  • Chiefs

    Daron Acemoglu, Terry Reed et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2014•Cited by: 109•References: 36

    We study the effect of constraints on chiefs' power on economic outcomes, citizens' attitudes, and social capital. A paramount chief in Sierra Leone must come from a ruling family originally recognized by British colonial authorities. In chiefdoms with fewer ruling families, chiefs face less political competition, and development outcomes are significantly worse today. Variation in the security of property rights over land is a potential mechanis…

  • Political foundations of the resource curse

    J A Robinson, Ragnar Torvik et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•2013•Cited by: 11•References: 6

  • Remembering John Marshall and Bitter Roots

    J A Robinson, Jason Robinson•ARTICLE•Journal of Southern African Studies•2013

  • Can't We All Be More Like Scandinavians? Asymmetric Growth and Institutions in an Interdependent World

    Daron Acemoglu, J A Robinson et al.•REPORT•National Bureau of Economic…•2012

    Because of their more limited inequality and more comprehensive social welfare systems, many perceive average welfare to be higher in Scandinavian societies than in the United States. Why then does the United States not adopt Scandinavian-style institutions? More generally, in an interdependent world, would we expect all countries to adopt the same institutions? To provide theoretical answers to this question, we develop a simple model of economi…

  • Social Structure and Development

    Daron Acemoglu, Tarek A Hassan et al.•ARTICLE•The Quarterly Journal of Economics•2011

    We document a statistical association between the severity of the persecution, displacement and mass murder of Jews by the Nazis during World War II and long-run economic and political outcomes within Russia. Cities that experienced the Holocaust most intensely have grown less, and both cities and administrative districts (oblasts) where the Holocaust had the largest impact have worse economic and political outcomes since the collapse of the Sovi…

  • Why Is Africa Poor

    Daron Acemoglu, J A Robinson•ARTICLE•Economic History of Developing…•2010•Cited by: 28•References: 43

    In this paper we take for granted that the poverty of Sub-Saharan Africa is to a large part explained by its political and economic institutions. As citizens Africans do not have the incentives to save and invest, as politicians they do not have the incentive to provide public goods. We focus on the issue of how Africa developed such institutions. Historically, no society had the types of institutions required for modern economic growth, though a…

  • Three Reviews of One Economics, Many Recipes

    Open Access•J A Robinson•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•2009

    Journal Article Three Reviews of One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions and Economic Growth Get access By Rodrik Dani. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press: 2008. Pp. 280. £19.95, cloth. ISBN: 978‐0‐691‐12951‐8) James A. Robinson James A. Robinson Harvard University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 119, Issue 535, 1 February 2009, Pages F214–F218, https:/…

  • Institutions and Economic Performance

    Open Access•Daron Acemoglu, Philippe Aghion et al.•BOOK•Institutions and Economic…•2008

    Institutions and Economic Performance explores the question of why income per capita varies so greatly across countries. Even taking into account disparities in resources, including physical and human capital, large economic discrepancies remain across countries. Why are some societies but not others able to encourage investments in places, people, and productivity? The answer, the book argues, lies to a large extent in institutional differences …

  • The South African Civil Union Act 2006

    Bradley Smith, B S Smith et al.•ARTICLE•International Journal of Law…•2008•Cited by: 2

    A ground-breaking judgment handed down by the Constitutional Court on 1 December 2005 gave parliament 1 year within which to promulgate legislation that facilitated same-sex marriage in South Africa. In response, the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 came into operation on 30 November 2006. This Act provides for the solemnization and registration of a civil union in the form of either a marriage or a civil partnership. While it can be accepted that the …

  • Property rights and the political organization of agriculture

    Open Access•Jonathan H Conning, Jonathan Conning et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•2006•Cited by: 7•References: 11

  • State Formation and Governance in Botswana

    J A Robinson•ARTICLE•Journal of African Economies•2006•Cited by: 22•References: 11

    Our analysis begins with the puzzle: how did Botswana develop a legal-rational state? We suggest that three key interlinked factors were important. First, during the pre-colonial period the Tswana developed local states with relatively limited kingship or chiefship and with a political structure that was able to integrate people of other ethnic groups such as Kalanga. Second, facing the onslaught first of the Boers, next of the British South Afri…

  • Political foundations of the resource curse

    Open Access•J A Robinson, Ragnar Torvik et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•2006•Cited by: 341•References: 10

  • The Rise of Europe

    Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson et al.•ARTICLE•American Economic Review•2005

    The rise of Western Europe after 1500 is due largely to growth in countries with access to the Atlantic Ocean and with substantial trade with the New World, Africa, and Asia via the Atlantic. This trade and the associated colonialism affected Europe not only directly, but also indirectly by inducing institutional change. Where “initial” political institutions (those established before 1500) placed significant checks on the monarchy, the growth of…

  • Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth

    Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson et al.•REPORT•National Bureau of Economic…•2004•Cited by: 132•References: 43

    This paper develops the empirical and theoretical case that differences in economic institutions are the fundamental cause of differences in economic development.We first document the empirical importance of institutions by focusing on two "quasi-natural experiments" in history, the division of Korea into two parts with very different economic institutions and the colonization of much of the world by European powers starting in the fifteenth cent…

  • Institutional causes, macroeconomic symptoms

    Open Access•Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Monetary Economics•2003

Next
  • Political foundations of the resource curse

    Open Access•J A Robinson, Ragnar Torvik et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•2006•Cited by: 341•References: 10

  • Democracy Does Cause Growth

    Daron Acemoglu, Naidu et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2018•Cited by: 226•References: 13

    We provide evidence that democracy has a positive effect on GDP per capita. Our dynamic panel strategy controls for country fixed effects and the rich dynamics of GDP, which otherwise confound the effect of democracy. To reduce measurement error, we introduce a new indicator of democracy that consolidates previous measures. Our baseline results show that democratizations increase GDP per capita by about 20 percent in the long run. We find similar…

  • Inter-Party Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Policies in the American States

    Richard E Dawson, J A Robinson•ARTICLE•The Journal of Politics•1963•Cited by: 179

  • Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth

    Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson et al.•REPORT•National Bureau of Economic…•2004•Cited by: 132•References: 43

    This paper develops the empirical and theoretical case that differences in economic institutions are the fundamental cause of differences in economic development.We first document the empirical importance of institutions by focusing on two "quasi-natural experiments" in history, the division of Korea into two parts with very different economic institutions and the colonization of much of the world by European powers starting in the fifteenth cent…

  • Chiefs

    Daron Acemoglu, Terry Reed et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2014•Cited by: 109•References: 36

    We study the effect of constraints on chiefs' power on economic outcomes, citizens' attitudes, and social capital. A paramount chief in Sierra Leone must come from a ruling family originally recognized by British colonial authorities. In chiefdoms with fewer ruling families, chiefs face less political competition, and development outcomes are significantly worse today. Variation in the security of property rights over land is a potential mechanis…

  • Is Child Labor Inefficient

    Jean‐marie Baland, J A Robinson•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2000•Cited by: 93•References: 1

    We build a model of child labor and study its implications for welfare. We assume that there is a trade-off between child labor and the accumulation of human capital. Even if parents are altruistic and child labor is socially inefficient, it may arise in equilibrium because parents fail to fully internalize its negative effects. This occurs when bequests are zero or when capital markets are imperfect. We also study the effects of a simple ban on …

  • Why Is Africa Poor

    Daron Acemoglu, J A Robinson•ARTICLE•Economic History of Developing…•2010•Cited by: 28•References: 43

    In this paper we take for granted that the poverty of Sub-Saharan Africa is to a large part explained by its political and economic institutions. As citizens Africans do not have the incentives to save and invest, as politicians they do not have the incentive to provide public goods. We focus on the issue of how Africa developed such institutions. Historically, no society had the types of institutions required for modern economic growth, though a…

  • State Formation and Governance in Botswana

    J A Robinson•ARTICLE•Journal of African Economies•2006•Cited by: 22•References: 11

    Our analysis begins with the puzzle: how did Botswana develop a legal-rational state? We suggest that three key interlinked factors were important. First, during the pre-colonial period the Tswana developed local states with relatively limited kingship or chiefship and with a political structure that was able to integrate people of other ethnic groups such as Kalanga. Second, facing the onslaught first of the Boers, next of the British South Afri…

  • Asymmetric Growth and Institutions in an Interdependent World

    Daron Acemoglu, J A Robinson et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2017•Cited by: 17•References: 11

    We present a model of technologically interconnected countries that benefit and potentially contribute to advances in the world technology frontier. Greater inequality between successful and unsuccessful entrepreneurs increases entrepreneurial effort and a country’s contribution to that frontier. Under plausible assumptions, the world equilibrium is asymmetric, involving different economic institutions and technology levels for different countrie…

  • Social Origins of Dictatorships

    Open Access•Naidu, Suresh Naidu et al.•ARTICLE•American Political Science Review•2021•Cited by: 15•References: 46

    Existing theories of democratic reversals emphasize that elites mount actions like coups when democracy is particularly threatening to their interests. However, existing theory has been largely silent on the role of elite social networks, which interact with economic incentives and may facilitate antidemocratic collective action. We develop a model where coups generate rents for elites and show that the effort an elite puts into a coup is increas…

  • Weak, Despotic, or Inclusive? How State Type Emerges from State versus Civil Society Competition

    Open Access•Daron Acemoglu, J A Robinson•ARTICLE•American Political Science Review•2023•Cited by: 11•References: 53

    We develop a theory of the accumulation of state capacity as the outcome of a political competition between elites and (civil) society. State capacity is accumulated by elites, and it is productive as well as useful in controlling society. However, society can fight back and accumulate its own capacity, facilitating collective action. The theory leads to three distinct equilibria depending on initial conditions. One type, a weak state, emerges wh…

  • Political foundations of the resource curse

    J A Robinson, Ragnar Torvik et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•2013•Cited by: 11•References: 6

  • Property rights and the political organization of agriculture

    Open Access•Jonathan H Conning, Jonathan Conning et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•2006•Cited by: 7•References: 11

  • Non-Modernization

    Open Access•Daron Acemoglu, J A Robinson et al.•ARTICLE•Annual Review of Political Science•2022•Cited by: 6•References: 39

    Modernization theory is a cornerstone of much of political science, despite the mounting evidence against its predictions. We outline a theory in which the distribution of political power critically combines with political culture. We call the basic components of culture “attributes” and argue that these can be combined into larger cultural configurations. These configurations interact with the distribution of power and lead to three distinct sel…

  • Multiple ejaculations during prolonged sexual tests and lack of resultant serum testosterone increases in male stumptail macaques (M. arctoides)

    Open Access•D A Goldfoot, A Koos Slob et al.•ARTICLE•Archives of Sexual Behavior•1975•Cited by: 5•References: 23

  • Faire la guerre et faire l 'État

    Steve Pincu, Steve Pincus et al.•ARTICLE•Annales Histoire Sciences Sociales•2016•Cited by: 2•References: 13

    Cet article propose une critique de la pertinence de la notion d'État fiscal-militaire, en se penchant plus particulièrement sur le cas exemplaire de la Grande-Bretagne qui consacra une part significativement moindre des revenus du gouvernement au domaine militaire que tout autre État européen. En outre, il met en lumière d'autres sources de dépenses civiles importantes, notamment l'investissement massif de l'État britannique dans le développemen…

  • The South African Civil Union Act 2006

    Bradley Smith, B S Smith et al.•ARTICLE•International Journal of Law…•2008•Cited by: 2

    A ground-breaking judgment handed down by the Constitutional Court on 1 December 2005 gave parliament 1 year within which to promulgate legislation that facilitated same-sex marriage in South Africa. In response, the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 came into operation on 30 November 2006. This Act provides for the solemnization and registration of a civil union in the form of either a marriage or a civil partnership. While it can be accepted that the …

  • Lawful systems dynamics in how poets choose their words

    Open Access•Anthony F Badalamenti, Robert Langs et al.•ARTICLE•Systems Research and Behavioral…•1994•Cited by: 1•References: 5

    This paper presents a quantified study of the use of words by seven famous male poets. The key measures are the waiting times between the invocation of new words and the complexity or informational entropy of word usage as the poem unfolds. The main stochastic finding is that the emergence of new words is a Poisson process. Each poet thus has a distinctive rate constant reflecting his likelihood of introducing new words. In all cases cumulative e…

  • Inter-Party Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Policies in the American States

    Richard E Dawson, J A Robinson•ARTICLE•The Journal of Politics•1963•Cited by: 179

  • Hume’s Two Definitions of “Cause”

    J A Robinson•CHAPTER•Hume•1966

  • Academic freedom and the occupation of Germany and Japan

    J A Robinson, James Robinson•ARTICLE•Bulletin of Concerned Asian…•1974•References: 2

    In the years 1948-54, New York University suffered an anticommunist “purge” of its faculty which was extreme even in its day. That the “McCarthyite” period at NYU was so vicious is at first puzzling. National hysteria about atomic secrets notwithstanding, it remains true that some universities with greater prestige (and hence seemingly of greater political importance) and others with more conservative administrations stopped far short of the susp…

  • Multiple ejaculations during prolonged sexual tests and lack of resultant serum testosterone increases in male stumptail macaques (M. arctoides)

    Open Access•D A Goldfoot, A Koos Slob et al.•ARTICLE•Archives of Sexual Behavior•1975•Cited by: 5•References: 23

  • Handbook of Logic in Artificial Intelligence and Logic Programming

    Dov M Gabbay, C J Hogger et al.•BOOK•Handbook of logic in artificial…•1993

    Logic is now widely recognized to be one of the foundational disciplines of computing and has found applications in virtually all aspects of the subject, from software engineering and hardware to programming languages and artificial intelligence. This Handbook has been created in response to the growing need for an in-depth survey of the applications of logic in AI and computer science. The Handbook of Logic in Artificial Intelligence and Logic P…

  • Handbook of logic in artificial intelligence and logic programming

    Dov M Gabbay, Christopher John Hogger et al.•BOOK•Handbook of logic in artificial…•1993

  • Handbook of Logic in Artificial Intelligence and Logic Programming

    Dov M Gabbay, C J Hogger et al.•BOOK•Handbook of Logic in Artificial…•1994

    Logic is now widely recognized to be one of the foundational disciplines of computing and has found applications in virtually all aspects of the subject, from software engineering and hardware to programming languages and artificial intelligence. There is a growing need for an in-depth survey of the applications in logic in A1 and computer science. The Handbook of Logic in Ariticial Intelligence and Logic Programming and its companion, the Handbo…

  • Handbook of Logic in Artificial Intelligence and Logic Programming

    Dov M Gabbay, C J Hogger et al.•BOOK•Handbook of Logic in Artificial…•1994

    Logic is now widely recognized to be one of the foundational disciplines of computing and has found applications in virtually all aspects of the subject, from software engineering and hardware to programming languages and artificial intelligence. There is a growing need for an in-depth survey of the applications of logic in Al and computer science. The Handbook of Logic in Articial Intelligence and Logic Programming and its companion, the Handboo…

  • Lawful systems dynamics in how poets choose their words

    Open Access•Anthony F Badalamenti, Robert Langs et al.•ARTICLE•Systems Research and Behavioral…•1994•Cited by: 1•References: 5

    This paper presents a quantified study of the use of words by seven famous male poets. The key measures are the waiting times between the invocation of new words and the complexity or informational entropy of word usage as the poem unfolds. The main stochastic finding is that the emergence of new words is a Poisson process. Each poet thus has a distinctive rate constant reflecting his likelihood of introducing new words. In all cases cumulative e…

  • Richard Carlton Snyder

    Open Access•Glenn D Paige, J A Robinson•ARTICLE•PS Political Science & Politics•1998

    An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. As you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button

  • Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective

    Daron Acemoglu, J A Robinson•ARTICLE•The Quarterly Journal of Economics•2000

    During the nineteenth century most Western societies extended voting rights, a decision that led to unprecedented redistributive programs. We argue that these political reforms can be viewed as strategic decisions by the political elite to prevent widespread social unrest and revolution. Political transition, rather than redistribution under existing political institutions, occurs because current transfers do not ensure future transfers, while th…

  • Taiwan’s 2000 presidential election

    Open Access•J A Robinson, Deborah Brown et al.•ARTICLE•Orbis•2000

  • Is Child Labor Inefficient

    Jean‐marie Baland, J A Robinson•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•2000•Cited by: 93•References: 1

    We build a model of child labor and study its implications for welfare. We assume that there is a trade-off between child labor and the accumulation of human capital. Even if parents are altruistic and child labor is socially inefficient, it may arise in equilibrium because parents fail to fully internalize its negative effects. This occurs when bequests are zero or when capital markets are imperfect. We also study the effects of a simple ban on …

  • Session 1a

    Open Access•Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson et al.•ARTICLE•The Journal of Economic History•2001

    Differences in institutions are thought to be a key part of the explanation for large cross-country differences in per capita income. Unfortunately, recent empirical research suffers from severe endogeneity problems. In this paper we provide both a theory of why different countries have different institutions and a way of measuring this, which does not suffer from endogeneity. We focus on economies that were colonized by European countries betwee…

  • Reversal of Fortune

    Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson et al.•ARTICLE•The Quarterly Journal of Economics•2002

    Among countries colonized by European powers during the past 500 years, those that were relatively rich in 1500 are now relatively poor. We document this reversal using data on urbanization patterns and population density, which, we argue, proxy for economic prosperity. This reversal weighs against a view that links economic development to geographic factors. Instead, we argue that the reversal reflects changes in the institutions resulting from …

  • Institutional causes, macroeconomic symptoms

    Open Access•Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Monetary Economics•2003

  • Chapter 4. An African Success Story

    Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson et al.•CHAPTER•In Search of Prosperity•2003

  • Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth

    Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson et al.•REPORT•National Bureau of Economic…•2004•Cited by: 132•References: 43

    This paper develops the empirical and theoretical case that differences in economic institutions are the fundamental cause of differences in economic development.We first document the empirical importance of institutions by focusing on two "quasi-natural experiments" in history, the division of Korea into two parts with very different economic institutions and the colonization of much of the world by European powers starting in the fifteenth cent…

  • The Rise of Europe

    Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson et al.•ARTICLE•American Economic Review•2005

    The rise of Western Europe after 1500 is due largely to growth in countries with access to the Atlantic Ocean and with substantial trade with the New World, Africa, and Asia via the Atlantic. This trade and the associated colonialism affected Europe not only directly, but also indirectly by inducing institutional change. Where “initial” political institutions (those established before 1500) placed significant checks on the monarchy, the growth of…

  • Property rights and the political organization of agriculture

    Open Access•Jonathan H Conning, Jonathan Conning et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•2006•Cited by: 7•References: 11

  • State Formation and Governance in Botswana

    J A Robinson•ARTICLE•Journal of African Economies•2006•Cited by: 22•References: 11

    Our analysis begins with the puzzle: how did Botswana develop a legal-rational state? We suggest that three key interlinked factors were important. First, during the pre-colonial period the Tswana developed local states with relatively limited kingship or chiefship and with a political structure that was able to integrate people of other ethnic groups such as Kalanga. Second, facing the onslaught first of the Boers, next of the British South Afri…

  • Political foundations of the resource curse

    Open Access•J A Robinson, Ragnar Torvik et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•2006•Cited by: 341•References: 10

  • Institutions and Economic Performance

    Open Access•Daron Acemoglu, Philippe Aghion et al.•BOOK•Institutions and Economic…•2008

    Institutions and Economic Performance explores the question of why income per capita varies so greatly across countries. Even taking into account disparities in resources, including physical and human capital, large economic discrepancies remain across countries. Why are some societies but not others able to encourage investments in places, people, and productivity? The answer, the book argues, lies to a large extent in institutional differences …

  • The South African Civil Union Act 2006

    Bradley Smith, B S Smith et al.•ARTICLE•International Journal of Law…•2008•Cited by: 2

    A ground-breaking judgment handed down by the Constitutional Court on 1 December 2005 gave parliament 1 year within which to promulgate legislation that facilitated same-sex marriage in South Africa. In response, the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 came into operation on 30 November 2006. This Act provides for the solemnization and registration of a civil union in the form of either a marriage or a civil partnership. While it can be accepted that the …

  • Three Reviews of One Economics, Many Recipes

    Open Access•J A Robinson•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•2009

    Journal Article Three Reviews of One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions and Economic Growth Get access By Rodrik Dani. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press: 2008. Pp. 280. £19.95, cloth. ISBN: 978‐0‐691‐12951‐8) James A. Robinson James A. Robinson Harvard University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 119, Issue 535, 1 February 2009, Pages F214–F218, https:/…

Political science (28 works) · Economics (22 works) · Law (19 works) · Politics (19 works) · Law (14 works) · Development economics (12 works) · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies (11 works) · Political economy (10 works) · Sociology (10 works) · Economic system (8 works)

Ethnos_APP • Open Source Project • MIT License • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacy and Cookies • API Documentation: api.ethnos.app/docs • API Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Frontend Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae