Saul A Kripke

Biographic Data

ID492502
NAMESaul A Kripke
GIVEN NAMESSaul A
FAMILY NAMEKripke
SIGNATUREKRIPKE S A
AFFILIATIONSThe Graduate Center, CUNY
ORCID0000-0001-7993-9456
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS18
TOTAL CITATIONS25
AUTHOR COUNT18
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1963
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2024
H-INDEX2

  • Individual Concepts

    Open AccessSaul A KripkeCHAPTERSaul Kripke on Modal Logic2024

  • Mathematical Incompleteness Results in First-Order Peano Arithmetic

    Saul A KripkeARTICLEHistory and Philosophy of Logic2022

    In the Handbook of Mathematical Logic, the Paris-Harrington variant of Ramsey's theorem is celebrated as the first result of a long ‘search’ for a purely mathematical incompleteness result in first-order Peano arithmetic. This paper questions the existence of any such search and the status of the Paris-Harrington result as the first mathematical incompleteness result. In fact, I argue that Gentzen gave the first such result, and that it was resta…

  • Excerpt from “Identity and Necessity”

    Saul A KripkeCHAPTERReadings in Philosophy of…2014

  • Yet Another Dogma of Empiricism

    Open AccessSaul A Kripke, Saul KripkeARTICLEPhilosophy and Phenomenological…2014References: 1

  • Reference and Existence

    Saul A KripkeBOOKReference and Existence2013

    Saul A. Kripke's Reference and Existence, the John Locke Lectures for 1973, can be read as a sequel to his classic Naming and Necessity. It confronts important issues left open in that work- among them, the semantics of proper names and natural kind terms as they occur in fiction and in myth; negative existential statements; the ontology of fiction and myth (whether it is true that fictional characters like Hamlet, or mythical kinds like bandersn…

  • Presupposition and Anaphora

    Saul A KripkeARTICLELinguistic Inquiry2009Cited by: 22References: 9

    Writers on presupposition, and on the "projection problem" of determining the presuppositions of compound sentences from their component clauses, traditionally assign presuppositions to each clause in isolation. I argue that many presuppositional elements are anaphoric to previous discourse or contextual elements. In compound sentences, these can be other clauses of the sentence. We thus need a theory of presuppositional anaphora, analogous to th…

  • Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference

    Open AccessSaul A KripkeARTICLETheoria2008

    Frege's theory of indirect contexts and the shift of sense and reference in these contexts has puzzled many. What can the hierarchy of indirect senses, doubly indirect senses, and so on, be? Donald Davidson gave a well‐known ‘unlearnability’ argument against Frege's theory. The present paper argues that the key to Frege's theory lies in the fact that whenever a reference is specified (even though many senses determine a single reference), it is s…

  • A Puzzle about Belief

    Saul A KripkeCHAPTERMeaning and Use2007

  • Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language

    Saul A KripkeBOOKWittgenstein on Rules and Private…2007

  • Law and Metaphysics

    Charles M Yablon, Saul A Kripke et al.ARTICLEThe Yale Law Journal1987

    There have always been lawyers deeply attracted to philosophical discourse.It is a phenomenon at least as old as Cicero,' and extends to the contemporary legal academic in search of an appropriate "fancy citation." 2 Such lawyers look to philosophy as a way of connecting law with broader questions of morality and truth.They tend to view at least some legal problems as manifestations of more fundamental philosophical questions.They may even look f…

  • Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language

    Fred Feldman, Saul A Kripke et al.ARTICLEPhilosophy and Phenomenological…1986Cited by: 2

  • Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language

    Barbara Abbott, Saul A KripkeARTICLELanguage1984

  • Facts and Super-Facts

    Peter Winch, Saul A KripkeARTICLEThe Philosophical Quarterly1983Cited by: 1

    Journal Article Facts and Super-Facts Get access Saul A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. An Elementary Exposition. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1982, pp. x + 150 Peter Winch Peter Winch King’s College, London Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 33, Issue 133, October 1983, Pages 398–404, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219167 Published: 01 October 1983

  • A Puzzle about Belief

    Saul A KripkeCHAPTERMeaning and Use1979

  • Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference

    Open AccessSaul A Kripke, Saul Kripke et al.ARTICLEMidwest Studies in Philosophy1977

  • Outline of a Theory of Truth

    Saul A Kripke, Saul KripkeARTICLEThe Journal of Philosophy1975

  • Naming and Necessity

    Saul A KripkeCHAPTERSemantics of Natural Language1972

  • Semantical Analysis of Modal Logic I Normal Modal Propositional Calculi

    Open AccessSaul A KripkeARTICLEMathematical Logic Quarterly1963