Zak A Kopeikin
Biographic Data
| ID | 7102290 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Zak A Kopeikin |
| GIVEN NAMES | Zak A |
| FAMILY NAME | Kopeikin |
| SIGNATURE | KOPEIKIN Z A |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Colorado Boulder |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8903-7018 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Value Invariabilism and Two Distinctions in Value
Bare‐difference methodology and the scientific analogy
The bare‐difference methodology is considered to be a powerful tool in ethical reasoning. The underlying idea is that we can identify the intrinsic evaluative significance of some feature by constructing contrast cases or bare‐difference cases , i.e., two cases that hold everything constant but for the feature of interest. While this popular methodology has been challenged by prominent philosophers such as Kagan, Thomson, and Kamm, it is intuitiv…
Violent Deaths, Vicious Preferences, and Bare-Differences
Hill [AJP, 2018] argues that Rachels’s famous bare-difference argument for the moral irrelevance between killing and letting die fails. In this paper, I argue that certain features in Hill’s cases might lead our intuitions astray. I propose new cases and suggest that they support the conclusion that, in itself, intentional killing is morally equivalent to intentional letting-die
Bare-Difference Methodology and a Problematic Separability Principle
No prominent works on this page.
Bare-Difference Methodology and a Problematic Separability Principle
Value Invariabilism and Two Distinctions in Value
Bare‐difference methodology and the scientific analogy
The bare‐difference methodology is considered to be a powerful tool in ethical reasoning. The underlying idea is that we can identify the intrinsic evaluative significance of some feature by constructing contrast cases or bare‐difference cases , i.e., two cases that hold everything constant but for the feature of interest. While this popular methodology has been challenged by prominent philosophers such as Kagan, Thomson, and Kamm, it is intuitiv…
Violent Deaths, Vicious Preferences, and Bare-Differences
Hill [AJP, 2018] argues that Rachels’s famous bare-difference argument for the moral irrelevance between killing and letting die fails. In this paper, I argue that certain features in Hill’s cases might lead our intuitions astray. I propose new cases and suggest that they support the conclusion that, in itself, intentional killing is morally equivalent to intentional letting-die
Epistemology (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Psychology (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (2 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (2 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (2 works) · Sociology (2 works) · Analogy (1 works)