C A Hooker
Biographic Data
| ID | 989267 |
|---|---|
| NAME | C A Hooker |
| GIVEN NAMES | C A |
| FAMILY NAME | Hooker |
| SIGNATURE | HOOKER C A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Western University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 30 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 94 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 30 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1968 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2012 |
| H-INDEX | 5 |
Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory
Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory
Philosophy of complex systems
Interaction and bio-cognitive order
Constructivism Between Transcendentalism and Convention
Asymptotics, Reduction and Emergence
All the major inter-theoretic relations of fundamental science are asymptotic ones, e.g. quantum theory as Planck's constant h → 0, yielding (roughly) Newtonian mechanics. Thus asymptotics ultimately grounds claims about inter-theoretic explanation, reduction and emergence. This paper examines four recent, central claims by Batterman concerning asymptotics and reduction. While these claims are criticised, the discussion is used to develop an enri…
Being there
Churchland Symposium
A Miller’s Tale
Idealisation, naturalism, and rationality
Control, Connectionism and Cognition
Projection, Physical Intelligibility, Objectivity and Completeness
It is shown how the development of physics has involved making explicit what were homocentric projections which had heretofore been implicit, indeed inexpressible in theory. This is shown to support a particular notion of the invariant as the real. On this basis the divergence in ideals of physical intelligibility between Bohr and Einstein is set out. This in turn leads to divergent, but explicit, conceptions of objectivity and completeness for p…
A Realistic Theory of Science
It is the main contention of Cliff Hooker's new book that a realistic theory of science, a theory which gives a good account of what actually goes on in science, should be based on realism. Many readers of this journal may disagree. They may be inclined to the view that a realistic theory of science must attribute a significant social component to scientific knowledge, and would see such a theory as incompatible with realism. I do not, however, b…
Energy and the Quality of Life
Graham Nerlich
Space (better: space-time) is a particular, the particular thing structuring our world. It has shape. And size. And reference to space and its properties is fundamental to physical explanation. This, in a nutshell, is Nerlich's position. Espousing it Nerlich marches against the tide of philosophical opinion which dominated the first half or more of this century. His arguments are laid out in a wholly enjoyable book: clearly and simply written, ‘m…
Towards a General Theory of Reduction. Part III
Any theory of reduction that goes only so far as carried in Parts I and II ([165], [166]) does only half the job. Prima facie at least, there are cases of would-be reduction which seem torn between two conflicting intuitions. On the one side there is a strong intuition that reduction is involved, and a strongly retentive reduction at that. On the other side it seems that the concepts at one level cross-classify those at the other level, so that t…
Towards a General Theory of Reduction. Part II
Part I of this trilogy, Historical and Scientific Setting , set out a general context for selecting a certain subclass of inter-theoretic relations as achieving appropriate explanatory and ontological unification – hence for properly being labelled reductive. Something of the complexity of these relations in real science was explored. The present article concentrates on the role which identity plays in structuring the reduction relation and so in…
Towards a General Theory of Reduction. Part I
The Three Papers comprising this series, together with my earlier [34] also published in this journal, constitute an attempt to set out the major issues in the theoretical domain of reduction and to develop (tentatively) a general theory of theory reduction. The fourth paper, [34], though published separately from this trio, is integral to the presentation and should be read in conjunction with these papers. Even so, the presentation is limited i…
Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory
Discussion Review
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Philosophy and meta-philosophy of science
On Global Theories
Contrary to the Empiricist model of science, successful sufficiently fundamental theories not only fit and unify their data fields but also prescribe the general terms in which relevantly to describe observation; specify what is and is not observable; specify the conditions under which what is observable, is observable; specify the instrumental means and reliability by which what is measurable is measured; specify what is causally, statistically,…
The Information-Processing Approach to the Brain-Mind and its Philosophical Ramifications
Systematic Realism
Joseph D. Sneed The logical structure of mathematical physics . Dordrecht, Holland
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Towards a General Theory of Reduction. Part I
The Three Papers comprising this series, together with my earlier [34] also published in this journal, constitute an attempt to set out the major issues in the theoretical domain of reduction and to develop (tentatively) a general theory of theory reduction. The fourth paper, [34], though published separately from this trio, is integral to the presentation and should be read in conjunction with these papers. Even so, the presentation is limited i…
Towards a General Theory of Reduction. Part III
Any theory of reduction that goes only so far as carried in Parts I and II ([165], [166]) does only half the job. Prima facie at least, there are cases of would-be reduction which seem torn between two conflicting intuitions. On the one side there is a strong intuition that reduction is involved, and a strongly retentive reduction at that. On the other side it seems that the concepts at one level cross-classify those at the other level, so that t…
Systematic Realism
Relevance and the Ravens
These are plausible statements of confirmation. But there is a general principle of confirmation, viz.: (3) Whatever confirms a given hypothesis also confirms any statement logically equivalent to it which is at least as plausible, but inconsistent with them. This fact constitutes the problem about the ravens. The most popular solution to this problem has been along the following. lines: that statement (i) is false; and that its plausibility is t…
Towards a General Theory of Reduction. Part II
Part I of this trilogy, Historical and Scientific Setting , set out a general context for selecting a certain subclass of inter-theoretic relations as achieving appropriate explanatory and ontological unification – hence for properly being labelled reductive. Something of the complexity of these relations in real science was explored. The present article concentrates on the role which identity plays in structuring the reduction relation and so in…
Asymptotics, Reduction and Emergence
All the major inter-theoretic relations of fundamental science are asymptotic ones, e.g. quantum theory as Planck's constant h → 0, yielding (roughly) Newtonian mechanics. Thus asymptotics ultimately grounds claims about inter-theoretic explanation, reduction and emergence. This paper examines four recent, central claims by Batterman concerning asymptotics and reduction. While these claims are criticised, the discussion is used to develop an enri…
A Realistic Theory of Science
It is the main contention of Cliff Hooker's new book that a realistic theory of science, a theory which gives a good account of what actually goes on in science, should be based on realism. Many readers of this journal may disagree. They may be inclined to the view that a realistic theory of science must attribute a significant social component to scientific knowledge, and would see such a theory as incompatible with realism. I do not, however, b…
Philosophy and meta-philosophy of science
On Global Theories
Contrary to the Empiricist model of science, successful sufficiently fundamental theories not only fit and unify their data fields but also prescribe the general terms in which relevantly to describe observation; specify what is and is not observable; specify the conditions under which what is observable, is observable; specify the instrumental means and reliability by which what is measurable is measured; specify what is causally, statistically,…
Idealisation, naturalism, and rationality
Interaction and bio-cognitive order
Control, Connectionism and Cognition
Projection, Physical Intelligibility, Objectivity and Completeness
It is shown how the development of physics has involved making explicit what were homocentric projections which had heretofore been implicit, indeed inexpressible in theory. This is shown to support a particular notion of the invariant as the real. On this basis the divergence in ideals of physical intelligibility between Bohr and Einstein is set out. This in turn leads to divergent, but explicit, conceptions of objectivity and completeness for p…
Sharp and the Refutation of the Einstein, Podolsky, Rosen Paradox
D. H. Sharp has recently argued that Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen failed to make good their claim that elementary quantum theory provides only an incomplete description of physical reality. Sharp expounds in detail three criticisms (a fourth is mentioned) which focus largely on formal features of the quantum theory. I argue, on grounds centered largely in our search for an adequate physical understanding of the micro domain, that each of these c…
Goodman, ‘Grue’ and Hempel
It is now commonly accepted that N. Goodman's predicate “grue” presents the theory of confirmation of C. G. Hempel (and other such theories) with grave difficulties. The precise nature and status of these “difficulties” has, however, never been made clear. In this paper it is argued that it is very unlikely that “grue” raises any formal difficulties for Hempel and appearances to the contrary are examined, rejected and an explanation of their intu…
The Information-Processing Approach to the Brain-Mind and its Philosophical Ramifications
Joseph D. Sneed The logical structure of mathematical physics . Dordrecht, Holland
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
The Non-Necessity of Qualitative Content
Central to the Empiricist conception of matter and epistemology is the distinction between the primary and secondary properties. This distinction is part of the apparatus needed to formulate and answer the question «What aspects of perceptual information yield true knowledge of reality?" Correlatively, the distinction enables the reconciliation of the commonsense and scientific conceptions of matter in the fundamental Lockean tenet that matter po…
Against Krips' Resolution of Two Paradoxes in Quantum Mechanics
Once upon a time the well-known paradoxes of quantum mechanics (one might even say the “traditional” paradoxes of quantum mechanics!—I refer here to paradoxes such as the Schrödinger cat and the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox) seemed especially difficult because of the rather bizarre behavior of the wave packet under the von Neumann theory of measurement, to which behavior these paradoxical situations seemed to draw especial attention. Quite rec…
Goodman, ‘Grue’ and Hempel
It is now commonly accepted that N. Goodman's predicate “grue” presents the theory of confirmation of C. G. Hempel (and other such theories) with grave difficulties. The precise nature and status of these “difficulties” has, however, never been made clear. In this paper it is argued that it is very unlikely that “grue” raises any formal difficulties for Hempel and appearances to the contrary are examined, rejected and an explanation of their intu…
Relevance and the Ravens
These are plausible statements of confirmation. But there is a general principle of confirmation, viz.: (3) Whatever confirms a given hypothesis also confirms any statement logically equivalent to it which is at least as plausible, but inconsistent with them. This fact constitutes the problem about the ravens. The most popular solution to this problem has been along the following. lines: that statement (i) is false; and that its plausibility is t…
Against Krips' Resolution of Two Paradoxes in Quantum Mechanics
Once upon a time the well-known paradoxes of quantum mechanics (one might even say the “traditional” paradoxes of quantum mechanics!—I refer here to paradoxes such as the Schrödinger cat and the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox) seemed especially difficult because of the rather bizarre behavior of the wave packet under the von Neumann theory of measurement, to which behavior these paradoxical situations seemed to draw especial attention. Quite rec…
Sharp and the Refutation of the Einstein, Podolsky, Rosen Paradox
D. H. Sharp has recently argued that Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen failed to make good their claim that elementary quantum theory provides only an incomplete description of physical reality. Sharp expounds in detail three criticisms (a fourth is mentioned) which focus largely on formal features of the quantum theory. I argue, on grounds centered largely in our search for an adequate physical understanding of the micro domain, that each of these c…
Joseph D. Sneed The logical structure of mathematical physics . Dordrecht, Holland
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
The Non-Necessity of Qualitative Content
Central to the Empiricist conception of matter and epistemology is the distinction between the primary and secondary properties. This distinction is part of the apparatus needed to formulate and answer the question «What aspects of perceptual information yield true knowledge of reality?" Correlatively, the distinction enables the reconciliation of the commonsense and scientific conceptions of matter in the fundamental Lockean tenet that matter po…
Systematic Realism
Philosophy and meta-philosophy of science
On Global Theories
Contrary to the Empiricist model of science, successful sufficiently fundamental theories not only fit and unify their data fields but also prescribe the general terms in which relevantly to describe observation; specify what is and is not observable; specify the conditions under which what is observable, is observable; specify the instrumental means and reliability by which what is measurable is measured; specify what is causally, statistically,…
The Information-Processing Approach to the Brain-Mind and its Philosophical Ramifications
Discussion Review
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory
Graham Nerlich
Space (better: space-time) is a particular, the particular thing structuring our world. It has shape. And size. And reference to space and its properties is fundamental to physical explanation. This, in a nutshell, is Nerlich's position. Espousing it Nerlich marches against the tide of philosophical opinion which dominated the first half or more of this century. His arguments are laid out in a wholly enjoyable book: clearly and simply written, ‘m…
Towards a General Theory of Reduction. Part III
Any theory of reduction that goes only so far as carried in Parts I and II ([165], [166]) does only half the job. Prima facie at least, there are cases of would-be reduction which seem torn between two conflicting intuitions. On the one side there is a strong intuition that reduction is involved, and a strongly retentive reduction at that. On the other side it seems that the concepts at one level cross-classify those at the other level, so that t…
Towards a General Theory of Reduction. Part II
Part I of this trilogy, Historical and Scientific Setting , set out a general context for selecting a certain subclass of inter-theoretic relations as achieving appropriate explanatory and ontological unification – hence for properly being labelled reductive. Something of the complexity of these relations in real science was explored. The present article concentrates on the role which identity plays in structuring the reduction relation and so in…
Towards a General Theory of Reduction. Part I
The Three Papers comprising this series, together with my earlier [34] also published in this journal, constitute an attempt to set out the major issues in the theoretical domain of reduction and to develop (tentatively) a general theory of theory reduction. The fourth paper, [34], though published separately from this trio, is integral to the presentation and should be read in conjunction with these papers. Even so, the presentation is limited i…
Energy and the Quality of Life
A Realistic Theory of Science
It is the main contention of Cliff Hooker's new book that a realistic theory of science, a theory which gives a good account of what actually goes on in science, should be based on realism. Many readers of this journal may disagree. They may be inclined to the view that a realistic theory of science must attribute a significant social component to scientific knowledge, and would see such a theory as incompatible with realism. I do not, however, b…
Projection, Physical Intelligibility, Objectivity and Completeness
It is shown how the development of physics has involved making explicit what were homocentric projections which had heretofore been implicit, indeed inexpressible in theory. This is shown to support a particular notion of the invariant as the real. On this basis the divergence in ideals of physical intelligibility between Bohr and Einstein is set out. This in turn leads to divergent, but explicit, conceptions of objectivity and completeness for p…
Control, Connectionism and Cognition
Idealisation, naturalism, and rationality
A Miller’s Tale
Being there
Churchland Symposium
Asymptotics, Reduction and Emergence
All the major inter-theoretic relations of fundamental science are asymptotic ones, e.g. quantum theory as Planck's constant h → 0, yielding (roughly) Newtonian mechanics. Thus asymptotics ultimately grounds claims about inter-theoretic explanation, reduction and emergence. This paper examines four recent, central claims by Batterman concerning asymptotics and reduction. While these claims are criticised, the discussion is used to develop an enri…
Philosophy (27 works) · Epistemology (26 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (14 works) · Computer Science (12 works) · Mathematics (10 works) · Philosophy of science (8 works) · Psychology (8 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (7 works) · Physics (7 works)