Criminal Conflicts and the Killing of Law Enforcement Officers in Mexico
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10071463 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Marco Alcocer (0000-0003-1632-9284, University of California, Merced and The Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 70 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 870-895 |
| Publication date | 2025-08-20 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/00220027251370091 |
| OpenAlex | W4413356994 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 36 |
Violence against law enforcement by criminal organizations is pervasive in Latin America yet largely unexplored. What explains why and where law enforcement is violently attacked, who is targeted, and how they are killed? This article contends that conflicts between criminal organizations incentivize warring organizations to attack law enforcement, particularly local officers, with more brazen violence. Two original datasets on killings of law enforcement in Mexico show that killings are overwhelmingly of local officers and most frequently perpetrated through coordinated attacks, not confrontations, executions, or kidnappings. Using data on cartels, I first document a strong association between criminal conflicts and the killing of law enforcement officers, and find that the association is driven by killings of state and municipal officers rather than federal officers enforcing the government crackdown. I further show that criminal conflicts increase brazen killings and killings of officers while off duty
Criminal law · Criminology · Enforcement · Law enforcement · Political science · Sociology · Crime Patterns and Interventions · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Law · Wildlife Conservation and Criminology Analyses
Why did Mexico become so violent? A self-reinforcing violent equilibrium caused by competition and enforcement
Organized Crime, Violence, and Politics
The Ambivalent State
The Killing Consensus
Making Peace in Drug Wars
Votes, Drugs, and Violence
The Informal Regulation of Criminal Markets in Latin America
Criminal Enterprises and Governance in Latin America and the Caribbean
Systemic violence in drug markets
Assessing dangerousness in policing
The Sicilian Mafia
The politics of drug violence
Increasing intergovernmental coordination to fight crime
Criminal Communication
Conceptualizing Criminal Governance
Policing and Political Violence
Understanding Mexico’s Drug Violence
The Logic of Criminal Territorial Control
Collusion, Co-Optation, or Evasion
Evade, Corrupt, or Confront? Organized Crime and the State in Brazil and Mexico
The Old Rules No Longer Apply
The Prevalence of Terrorist Motives Among Civilians Who Kill Police Officers
Hiding violence to deal with the state
Killing in the Slums
State Regulation of Organized Crime
Police Protection Rackets and Political Modernity in Mexico
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2026 - 2026 (1) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |