Conflict and Limits of Power
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10071606 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Nozomu Matsubara (The University of Tokyo, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1989 |
| Volume | 33 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 113-141 |
| Publication date | 1989-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002789033001005 |
| OpenAlex | W2089505059 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 47 |
Since Dahl's definition, every effort to measure power has aimed simultaneously to conceptualize and to substantiate the meaning of power. However, there is a substantial lack of rigorous and concrete models of power as a basis to discuss various characteristics of power in international politics. In this model, the “limit of power” is defined and measured. Axelrod's model of a “bully” suggests a prototype of power seeker, but Rapoport and Chammah's empirical data on intrinsic defection probability play the critical role in making it measurable in Dahl's sense. The distribution of power as related to Axelrod's conflict of interest is neither directly nor inversely proportional to C.I.. Three phases of C.I.—mild, moderate, and severe—are shown to characterize three important types of international political and political economy systems: alliance, interdependence, and bipolarity, respectively. Other important characteristics of power are formulated, as the rate of collective goods consumed, credibility, the acquisitive and punitive efficacies of power, and characteristics of the limit of power are reviewed in comparison with the Shapley-Shubik power index
Credibility · Econometrics · Economics · Index (typography · Limit (mathematics · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Power (physics · Punitive damages · Computer Science · International Development and Aid · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Mathematics · Political Conflict and Governance
Reputation and imperfect information
Two-Person Cooperative Games
The Bargaining Problem
The chain store paradox
After Hegemony
Conflict Among Nations
Martin Wight and the theory of international relations
Man and His Government
Game Theory and the Analysis of International Conflicts
The Logic of Collective Action
The Logic of Collective Action
Games and Decisions
The Nerves of Government
Prisoner's Dilemma
Politics among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace
Aspects of Inductive Logic
Rules Rather than Discretion
The International System. Theoretical Essays
Assumptions of Rationality and Non-Rationality in Models of the International System
What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980
Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy
Measurement Concepts in the Theory of Influence
Approaches to the Understanding of Decentralization
Game theory, behavior, and the paradox of the Prisoner's Dilemma
The calculus of deterrence
Group Size and Cooperation
Individual Contributions for Collective Goods
A Game Theoretic Analysis of Olson's Game of Collective Action
Public Goods, Property Rights, and Political Organizations
The limits of hegemonic stability theory
Three approaches to the measurement of power in international relations
Collective Goods and International Organization
Increasing the Incentives for International Cooperation
Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability
The concept of power
Two-Person Game Theory
Some Ambiguities in the Notion of Power
Two Faces of Power
Bargaining
Decisions and Nondecisions
A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |