Fascism in Italy
The Second Wave
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10074101 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Adrian Lyttelton (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1966 |
| Volume | 1 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 75-100 |
| Publication date | 1966-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Contemporary History (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0094 • E-ISSN: 1461-7250 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/002200946600100106 |
| OpenAlex | W1790307473 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
The fascist seizure of power was a lengthy process. Beginning in the autumn of 1921 with the piecemeal destruction or absorption of the machinery of local administration, it was finally completed only with the reform of the Chamber of Deputies in 1928. But in this slow process two dramatic 'leaps' have always been recognized as decisive. The first, obviously, is the March on Rome; the second is the end of the Matteotti crisis in January I925. Mussolini's speech on 3 January was taken by the Italian Republic to mark the break between the constitutional regime and the dictatorship. There is an important difference between the two leaps; the March on Rome was the culmination of a steady process of encroachment on the powers of the State, whereas the action of Mussolini in January 1925 was the reversal of what seemed like the fatal disintegration of his power and of the whole fascist movement, and the initiation of a new phase, the 'second wave' of fascism. How was it possible that eighteen months after the March on Rome the murder of an opposition deputy could threaten the very foundation of Mussolini's power ? This harsh question needs to be asked; without the existence of a parliamentary opposition, a partially free press, and a partially free magistracy, the whole Matteotti crisis would have been unthinkable. Moreover, the murder itself was in a sense characteristic of a regime which lacked legal sanctions against its opponents. The fascist leaders continued to find terrorism necessary, but they were not prepared to assume full responsibility for it. The significance of Mussolini's 3 January speech was that he took this decisive step; 'I declare . . . that I, and I alone, assume the political, moral, and historical responsibility for all that has happened ... If fascism has been a criminal association, if all the acts of violence have been the result of a certain historical, political, and moral climate, the responsibility for this is mine.'1
Democracy · Dictatorship · Economic history · Economics · LEAPS · Opposition (politics · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · History · Italian Fascism and Post-war Society · Law
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,1 |
| Citation span | 1984 - 2020 (37) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |