Priming of mediators in causal attribution
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10158811 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Tamara J Ferguson (University of Alberta, corresponding author), Gary L Wells (0000-0002-5723-8998) |
| Year | 1980 |
| Volume | 38 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 461-470 |
| Publication date | 1980-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3514 • E-ISSN: 1939-1315 |
| Publisher | American Psychological Association (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1037//0022-3514.38.3.461 |
| OpenAlex | W4240656131 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 8 |
| References cited | 15 |
According to Kelley, the process of making person, stimulus, and circumstance attributions is based on the three informational criteria of consensus, consistency, and distinctiveness. Two studies were conducted to assess how the relative accessibility of these three process-relevant criteria affected the time required to make the three attributions. Accessibility was manipulated in both studies by giving subjects a recall test (prime) for at least one of the three informational criteria. Subjects in both studies observed a scenario, after which they were primed for one or more of the three criteria and were then asked to scale one of the three attributions. In Experiment 1 (TV = 93), participants were primed for either all three process-relevant criteria or three pieces of attributionally irrelevant information. Thirty seconds after the accessibility manipulation, subjects scaled a person, stimulus, or circumstance attribution. Priming the process-relevant information decreased subsequent attribution decision time relative to the control group. In Experiment 2 (N = 137) participants were primed for consensus, distinctiveness, or consistency, after which they scaled one of the three attributions. As expected, attribution decision times were lower when all three factors were primed (Experiment 1) than when only one of the three factors was primed (Experiment 2). In addition, stimulus and person attributions were made fastest when consensus and distinctiveness, respectively, were primed. Finally, priming cognitive access to a single factor made that factor dominate the scaled attributions. These results lend support to Kelley's model, in that the priming of information presumably relevant to the attribution process reduced the time observers required to make attribution decisions
Attribution · Cognition · Cognitive psychology · Optimal distinctiveness theory · Priming (agriculture · Recall · Stimulus (psychology · Conflict Management and Negotiation · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies · Psychology · Social and Intergroup Psychology · Social Psychology
Current Issues in Attribution Theory and Research
Lay Epistemic Theory in Social-Cognitive Psychology
Extraversion, social cognition, and the salience of aversiveness in social encounters
A focus theory of normative conduct
An intrasubject approach to causal attribution
Trait attributions
A test of the joint model of causal attribution
Attribution and reconstructive memory
Salience, Attention, and Attribution
Availability versus accessibility of information in memory for words
Semantic priming and retrieval from lexical memory
From Acts To Dispositions The Attribution Process In Person Perception
The Intuitive Psychologist And His Shortcomings
The rocky road from acts to dispositions
Constraint and target effects in the attribution of attitudes
The attribution of attitudes
The processes of causal attribution
Do people use consensus information in making causal attributions
The cognitive dynamics of salience in the attribution process
Order of consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency information and causal attributions
A closer examination of causal inference
The how and what of why
Availability
| Unique citing works | 8 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,18 |
| Citation span | 1982 - 1997 (16) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 8 |