Does Externalism Entail the Anomalism of the Mental
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10690464 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Nicholas Shea (0000-0002-2032-5705, King's College London, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2003 |
| Volume | 53 |
| Issue | 211 |
| Pages | 201-213 |
| Publication date | 2003-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/1467-9213.00306 |
| OpenAlex | W2014762480 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 11 |
In ‘Mental Events’ Donald Davidson argued for the anomalism of the mental on the basis of the operation of incompatible constitutive principles in the mental and physical domains. Many years later, he has suggested that externalism provides further support for the anomalism of the mental. I examine the basis for that claim. The answer to the question in the title will be a qualified ‘Yes’. That is an important result in the metaphysics of mind and an interesting consequence of externalism
Epistemology · Externalism · Internalism and externalism · Metaphysics · Philosophy of mind · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Scientific Research and Philosophical Inquiry
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |