Fairness, Individuality, and Free Riding
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10690712 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Christopher Morgan-Knapp (Binghamton University), Christopher Morgan‐Knapp (Binghamton University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 72 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 940-959 |
| Publication date | 2022-09-08 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pq/pqab075 |
| OpenAlex | W4206814565 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 12 |
According to most contemporary theorists, free riding on the cooperative contributions of others is unfair. At the same time, obligations to contribute to cooperative schemes can compel conformity with conventional practices, and can do so to a degree that poses a real threat to individuality. This paper exposes this tension between fairness and individuality, and proposes a way to resolve it. The resolution depends on an alternative approach to understanding fairness—one that appeals to the relational goods fairness is meant to maintain. In particular, norms of fairness protect against the interactions within a relationship becoming disrespectful. Many instances of free riding are indeed disrespectful and hence unfair. But this is not always so: one can choose to live a lifestyle that fails to return the benefits their community provides without disrespecting one's fellows. It is thus possible to free ride without being unfair, and so duties of fairness need not add to those already formidable forces that threaten to extinguish valuable individuality
Conformity · Economics · Free rider problem · Free riding · Incentive · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Public good · Sociology · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology · Social Psychology
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |