Consent theory as hermeneutical injustice
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10692206 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jonathan Ichikawa (University of British Columbia) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 75 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 1344-1365 |
| Publication date | 2025-10-15 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pq/pqaf033 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 39 |
I describe respects in which an overemphasis on the role of consent in sexual ethics gives rise to hermeneutical injustices. Although consent is widely invoked with feminist motivations to combat rape culture, the role to which it is often put, I argue, is often antithetical to its laudable feminist aims. Various influential stereotypes about consent and sex influence the public imagination, interacting to produce and reinforce harmful ‘inference tickets’ that impede public and individual understanding of important positive and negative kinds of sexual interactions. Rather than trying to replace inadequate conceptions of consent with more inflationary ones, I suggest that feminists should use different language and frameworks to express their critiques and motivate positive cultural change
Stereotypes
Epistemic Injustice and the Preservation of Ignorance
Rape Myths and Domestic Abuse Myths as Hermeneutical Injustices
Family resemblances
Just Sex?
Defensiveness and Identity
Not What I Agreed To
A Nonideal Theory of Sexual Consent
Consent to Sexual Relations
One Too Many
Hermeneutical Injustice
Sexual Fluency
Was It Rape? The Function of Women's Rape Myth Acceptance and Definitions of Sex in Labeling Their Own Experiences
Carnapian explication and ameliorative analysis
Normative Inference Tickets
Women and Consent
The cruel optimism of sexual consent
Conceptual Ethics I
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 3 |
| Citation span | 2026 - 2026 (1) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |