A responsibilist account of knowledge
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10692225 |
|---|---|
| Authors | XINGMING HU (0000-0002-6967-2177, Nanjing University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Publication date | 2025-05-07 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pq/pqaf041 |
| OpenAlex | W4410139548 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 31 |
This paper argues for a responsibilist account of knowledge: S knows that p iff S believes the truth that p (rather than one of the alternatives to p) because S forms/retains the belief in a way that is ultima facie epistemically responsible. This account implies that knowing that p requires neither having evidence that favors p over ∼p, nor possessing reliabilist virtues, nor exhibiting responsibilist virtues or motives
Clinical Reasoning and Diagnostic Skills · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
The Inquiring Mind
Achieving Knowledge
Judgment and Agency
Virtues of the Mind
Knowledge
Analysis and Metaphysics
Epistemic norms on evidence-gathering
Remembering requires no reliability
Epistemic practices
Safety, Closure, and Extended Methods
Responsibilist Virtue Epistemology
John Greco’s The Transmission of Knowledge
Knowledge without safety
Justified Belief and Epistemically Responsible Action
Evidentialism, Vice, and Virtue
The Abductivist Reply to Skepticism
Modal Virtue Epistemology
Degrees of Epistemic Criticizability
Evidentialism and Epistemic Duties to Inquire
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |