Subject Sensitive Invariantism
In Memoriam
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10692350 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Martijn Blaauw (0000-0002-5680-1515, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2008 |
| Volume | 58 |
| Issue | 231 |
| Pages | 318-325 |
| Publication date | 2008-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.532.x |
| OpenAlex | W2145505582 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 8 |
Subject sensitive invariantism is the view that whether a subject knows depends on what is at stake for that subject: the truth-value of a knowledge-attribution is sensitive to the subject's practical interests. I argue that subject sensitive invariantism cannot accept a very plausible principle for memory to transmit knowledge. I argue, furthermore, that semantic contextualism and contrastivism can accept this plausible principle for memory to transmit knowledge. I conclude that semantic contextualism and contrastivism are in a dialectical position better than subject sensitive invariantism is. © 2007 The Author
Library science · Subject (documents) · Classics · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · History · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,2 |
| Citation span | 2016 - 2022 (7) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |