Sense and Certainty
A Dissolution of Scepticism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10693848 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jonathan Dancy, Marie Mcginn (0009-0007-1660-3489) |
| Year | 1992 |
| Volume | 101 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 684 |
| Publication date | 1992-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2186080 |
| OpenAlex | W2083828888 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 18 |
Preface 1 The Problem of Scepticism 2 The Conflict Between Scepticism and Common Sense 3 Moore's Defence of Common Sense 4 On the Significance of What We Would Ordinarily Doubt 5 On the Significance of What We Would Ordinarily Claim to Know 6 Wittgenstein on the Philosopher's Use of `I Know' 7 Wittgenstein on Certainty 8 On the Status of Moore-Type Propositions
Certainty · Epistemology · Sense (electronics) · Skepticism · Chemistry · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications
Philosophical Investigations into AI Alignment
Hinge commitments and trust
Axiological hinge commitments
Beliefs, delusions, hinge commitments
Hinge commitments and common knowledge
Ni Fundacionismo Ni Coherentismo
Scientific Method in Practice
Understanding Wittgenstein’s On Certainty
Does Epistemology Rest on a Mistake? Understanding Rorty on Scepticism
Understanding Deep Disagreement
Common Knowledge and Hinge Epistemology
Hinge Epistemology
Transformative Experience in Skepticism. The External Standpoint and the Finitude of the Human Condition
Sosa on scepticism and the background
Epistemic Norms and the Limits of Epistemology
Hinge commitments vis-à-vis the transmission problem
Wittgenstein and the groundlessness of our believing
Against epistemic absolutism
| Unique citing works | 18 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,69 |
| Citation span | 2000 - 2025 (26) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 12 |