Reid's Anti-Sensationalism and His Realism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10694512 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Keith Derose (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1989 |
| Volume | 98 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 313 |
| Publication date | 1989-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2185022 |
| OpenAlex | W2319758790 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 9 |
I wish to discuss Thomas Reid's defense of and case for realism with respect to mind-independent bodies (material objects). While Reid's realism has received a good deal of attention lately, what I believe to be the centerpiece of Reid's case for his realism his anti-sensationalist view of our concepts of bodies and their qualities-has been largely neglected. In what follows, I show the connection between Reid's anti-sensationalism and his realism, and I then critically assess Reid's anti-sensationalism. Reid's views are developed largely as a reaction to the views of Berkeley and Hume. It will be important, therefore, to examine some of the relevant aspects of these philosophers' thought and Reid's interpretation of them
Analytic philosophy · Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · General interest · Media studies · Realism · Sensationalism · Sociology · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Theology and Philosophy of Evil
The Treatise
A Reidian Transcendental Argument Against Skepticism
Reid, Hardness and Developmental Psychology
The Sensation/Perception Distinction in Reid and Schopenhauer
Re-evaluating Reid's Response to Skepticism
Thomas Reid
Solving the Skeptical Problem
The Problem with Reid's Direct Realism
Reid and Epistemic Naturalism
| Unique citing works | 9 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,29 |
| Citation span | 1995 - 2026 (32) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 9 |