A Dominance Argument Against Incompleteness
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10695400 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Christian Tarsney (0000-0002-6324-7145, University of Toronto), Harvey Lederman (0000-0001-9438-097X, The University of Texas at Austin), Dean Spears (0000-0001-7905-9192, The University of Texas at Austin) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 134 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 455-490 |
| Publication date | 2025-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470 |
| Publisher | Duke University Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1215/00318108-11964820 |
| OpenAlex | W4414692400 |
| Language | FR |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 30 |
This article presents a new argument against many forms of moral and prudential value incompleteness. The argument relies on two central principles: (i) a weak “negative dominance” principle, to the effect that lottery 1 is better than lottery 2 only if some possible outcome of lottery 1 is better than some possible outcome of lottery 2, and (ii) a weak form of ex ante Pareto, to the effect that, if lottery 1 gives an unambiguously better (stochastically dominant) prospect to some individuals than lottery 2, and equally good prospects to everyone else, then lottery 1 is better than lottery 2. Given modest auxiliary assumptions, these two principles rule out incompleteness in the prudential ranking of individual lives, and many forms of incompleteness in the moral rankings of outcomes and lotteries
Argument (complex analysis) · Dominance (genetics) · Ex-ante · Lottery · Outcome (game theory) · Ranking (information retrieval) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Ethics out of Economics
Risk and Rationality
An Impossibility Theorem for Welfarist Axiologies
The Possibility of Parity
A theory of anticipated utility
The Oxford Handbook of Population Ethics
Population axiology and the possibility of a fourth category of absolute value
The case for comparability
Dimensions of value
On two arguments for fanaticism
Infinite Aggregation and Risk
Decision Making in the Face of Parity
Consequences of comparability
Two Distinctions in Goodness
Parity and Pareto
Rational risk‐aversion
Value Relations
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2026 - 2026 (1) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |