A Godelian Thesis Regarding Mathematical Objects
Do They Exist? and Can We Perceive Them
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10698439 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Charles S Chihara (corresponding author) |
| Year | 1982 |
| Volume | 91 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 211 |
| Publication date | 1982-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2184627 |
| OpenAlex | W2327986638 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
I n recent years, ontological Platonism1 has gained respectability in philosophical circles, primarily, I believe, because some distinguished logicians have defended certain arguments that are thought to support it. Among these I would like Kurt Gbdel, George Kreisel, and Willard Quine.2 This paper is concerned with a particular claim about Platonism in mathematics made by the first two mentioned above. In Part I, I shall assess what I take to be the justifications given by these philosophers for this claim. In Part II, Penelope Maddy's recent defense of Gddel's views will be examined and criticized
Analytic philosophy · Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · General interest · Computer Science · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History · Psychology
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,09 |
| Citation span | 1991 - 2022 (32) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |