Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10698729 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Isaac Levi, R C Jeffrey |
| Year | 1983 |
| Volume | 92 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 116 |
| Publication date | 1983-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2184531 |
| OpenAlex | W2040775764 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 91 |
Advanced Algebra and Logic · Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference · Computer Science · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Philosophy
A Defense of Imprecise Credences in Inference and Decision Making1
Wouldn’t it be Lovely
Carnap's inductive probabilities as a contribution to decision theory
Bias and error in human judgment
Indistinguishability as a constraint on priors
Two roads to retrocausality
Geometric Pooling
Conquering Mount Everett
The Third Way on Objective Probability
Socratic Epistemology
Probability Theory
Bayesian Estimation and Inference
On Indeterminate Probabilities
The Principal Principle Does Not Imply the Principle of Indifference
D. H. Mellor The Matter of Chance
Evidence and Uncertainty in Everett’s Multiverse
The Principal Principle Does Not Imply the Principle of Indifference, Because Conditioning on Biconditionals Is Counterintuitive
Beauty and the Bets
Why Scientists Gather Evidence
Stochastic Einstein Locality Revisited
What Is Risk Aversion
The Doomsday Argument Adam & Eve, UN++, and Quantum Joe
Explanationist Aid for the Theory of Inductive Logic
Imprecise Bayesianism and Global Belief Inertia
The Bayesian Treatment of Auxiliary Hypotheses
Everettian Confirmation and Sleeping Beauty
A New Solution to the Paradoxes of Rational Acceptability
Hempel's Raven Paradox
A Demonstration of the Incompleteness of Calculi of Inductive Inference
A Closer Look at the ‘New’ Principle
Inductive Reasoning with Multi-dimensional Concepts
Objective Probability in Everettian Quantum Mechanics
Hume's Inductive Logic
Epistemology Quantized
Updating, Undermining, and Independence
Everettian Confirmation and Sleeping Beauty
Credence
Toward a propensity interpretation of stochastic mechanism for the life sciences
Probability, rational single-case decisions and the Monty Hall Problem
Locating IBE in the Bayesian framework
Are non-accidental regularities a cosmic coincidence? Revisiting a central threat to Humean laws
Sleeping beauty should be imprecise
Rationality and indeterminate probabilities
Norms of assertion and communication in social networks
Fair infinite lotteries
From values to probabilities
Self-location is no problem for conditionalization
Intentionality and partial belief
Epistemic justification
Deterministic probability
Lost memories and useless coins
The philosophy of Hans Reichenbach
Explicativity, corroboration, and the relative odds of hypotheses
Sleeping Beauty and Self-location
A normative framework for argument quality
Irrelevant conjunction and the ratio measure or historical skepticism
Logic with numbers
Conditioning, intervening, and decision
Many worlds
A deference model of epistemic authority
New foundations for counterfactuals
Sleeping Beauty and shifted Jeffrey conditionalization
Causality as a theoretical concept
The logico-linguistic evidence underlying Montague's language descriptions
Probabilistic truthlikeness, content elements, and meta-inductive probability optimization
The new Tweety puzzle
Truthlikeness
Correcting credences with chances
How Causal Probabilities Might Fit into Our Objectively Indeterministic World
Credence and self-location
Vagueness and Inductive Molding
Trust and the value of overconfidence
Ambiguity aversion behind the veil of ignorance
Induction, probabilités et confirmation chez carnap
Conditional Degree of Belief and Bayesian Inference
Enumerative Induction and Lawlikeness
Chalmers on Consciousness and Quantum Mechanics
Induction, Conceptual Spaces and Ai
How Valuable Are Chances
Making Fit Fit
There Are No Universal Rules for Induction
Popper on Induction and Independence
Laws of Nature” as an Indexical Term
Accuracy-First Epistemology Without Additivity
No One Knows the Date or the Hour
Inductive Logic and the Ravens Paradox
The Temporal Asymmetry of Influence Is Not Statistical
Credence in the Image of Chance
For Universal Rules, Against Induction
Epidemiological Evidence
Probability and Evidence
| Unique citing works | 91 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,72 |
| Citation span | 1973 - 2024 (52) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 83 |