Epistemic Rationality and the Value of Truth
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10698857 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Sophia Dandelet (0000-0003-1524-5687, University of Cambridge, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 133 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 329-365 |
| Publication date | 2024-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470 |
| Publisher | Duke University Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1215/00318108-11494797 |
| OpenAlex | W4405306310 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 41 |
Veritism is the idea that what makes a belief epistemically rational is that it is a fitting response to the value of truth. This idea promises to serve as the foundation for an elegant and systematic treatment of epistemic rationality, one that illuminates the importance of distinctively epistemic normative standards without sacrificing extensional adequacy. But this article proposes that veritism cannot fulfill this promise. It goes on to explain why not, in part by showing that three radically different developments of veritism—one consequentialist, one deontological, and one virtue-theoretic—face eerily similar problems. This article also attempts to provide a general explanation of why any version of veritism is doomed to fail. If these arguments are successful, their upshot is that we must look beyond the value of truth if we want to understand the nature and significance of epistemic rationality
Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · General interest · Rationality · Truth value · Value (mathematics) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Reason Without Freedom
Belief, credence, and norms
Evidentialism
The Trolley Problem
Concepts of Epistemic Justification
Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy
Contractualism and utilitarianism
Two Kinds of Respect
Belief gambles in epistemic decision theory
Epistemic norms on evidence-gathering
Knowledge in a Social World
Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Function
Epistemology, Realism, and Truth
Epistemic reasons for action
Why can’t what is true be valuable
Intellectual virtues and the epistemic value of truth
Justified Belief and Epistemically Responsible Action
An Epistemic Nonconsequentialism
Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions
The relationship between belief and credence
How to Be an Epistemic Value Pluralist
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 3 |
| Citation span | 2025 - 2026 (2) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |