Synthesizing the Leeway model and the source model for compatibilism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10813232 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jingbo Hu (0000-0002-1541-3428, Huazhong Agricultural University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 205 |
| Issue | 6 |
| Publication date | 2025-06-05 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Synthese (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0039-7857 • E-ISSN: 1573-0964 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11229-025-05072-w |
| OpenAlex | W4411067710 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 61 |
Contemporary compatibilists, united in the view that freedom and determinism are compatible, are nevertheless divided. Leeway compatibilists maintain that freedom is characterized by the ability to do otherwise, whereas source compatibilists hold that freedom consists in the actual sequence of events issuing in the action. In this article, I offer a hybrid account drawing on insights from both camps. My account hinges on a distinction between free agency and free action. I suggest that one should employ the leeway model when theorizing about free agency, and the source model when theorizing about free action. This enables compatibilists to resolve an apparent conflict: Frankfurt-style cases suggest that freedom does not require alternative possibilities but this goes strongly against our common-sense conception of freedom. In addition, my account helps compatibilists to gain a more complete and coherent understanding of human freedom
Compatibilism · Determinism · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of science · Free Will and Agency · Healthcare Decision-Making and Restraints · Philosophy · War, Ethics, and Justification
Options and Agency
Responsibility and Control
Causation and Free Will
Causes, Laws, and Free Will
Springs Of Action
Free Will and Luck
Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility
How to speak of the colors
Masked Abilities and Compatibilism
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person
What ‘must’ and ‘can’ must and can mean
Reasons-Responsiveness, Agents, and Mechanisms1
Free Agency
Moral Appraisability
Reasons-Responsiveness and the Challenge of Irrelevance
Reasons-responsiveness, modality and rational blind spots
The ability to do otherwise and the new dispositionalism
Actual Sequences, Frankfurt-Cases, and Non-accidentality
Control and abilities to do otherwise
Are we free to break the laws
Rescuing Frankfurt-Style Cases
Libertarianism and Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities
The Agentive Modalities
Ceteris Paribus, I Could Have Done Otherwise
Why Frankfurt-Examples Don’t Need to Succeed to Succeed
Reasons‐sensitivity and degrees of free will
Dispositions and Conditionals
Finkish Dispositions
Moral Responsibility Without General Ability
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |