Are Colombian sickness funds cream skimming enrollees? An analysis with suggestions for policy improvement
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11680947 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Antonio J Trujillo (0000-0002-0800-8512, University of Central Florida, corresponding author), Dawn C McCalla (University of Central Florida) |
| Year | 2004 |
| Volume | 23 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 873-888 |
| Publication date | 2004-08-25 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Policy Analysis and Management (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0276-8739 • E-ISSN: 1520-6688 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1002/pam.20052 |
| PMID | 15499708 |
| OpenAlex | W1983213360 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 18 |
One of the primary objectives of Colombian social health insurance reform was to increase competition among for-profit insurers. Unfortunately, the flat capitated formula creates an opportunity for sickness funds to maximize reimbursement gains by cream skimming--selecting against unhealthy individuals. This paper explores sickness fund selection behavior to evaluate the efficiency losses associated with the introduction of managed competition in Colombia. Data from a 1997 Colombian household survey are analyzed with a bivariate probit model with partial observability using instrumental variables. The model yields some evidence of sickness fund selection based on health status. Public policy options to discourage risk selection by health status are discussed
Actuarial science · Bivariate analysis · Business · Competition (biology · Econometrics · Economic growth · Economics · Health care · Multivariate probit model · Probit model · Public economics · Public fund · Reimbursement · Global Health Care Issues · Healthcare Policy and Management · Healthcare Systems and Reforms
A Guide to Living Standards Measurement Study Surveys and Their Data Sets
Partial observability in bivariate probit models
The Demand for Post-Acute and Chronic Care in Nursing Homes
Supply-Side and Demand-Side Cost Sharing in Health Care
Forming and reforming the market for third-party purchasing of health care
The Benefits of Asymmetric Markets
Job Queues and the Union Status of Workers
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |