Moral hazard at sea
How alliances actually increase low-level maritime provocations between allies
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11894989 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Hayoun Jessie Ryou-Ellison (University of Tennessee at Knoxville, corresponding author), Aaron Gold (0000-0003-0841-039X, Sewanee: The University of the South) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 46 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 111-132 |
| Publication date | 2019-11-12 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Interactions (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0305-0629 • E-ISSN: 1547-7444 |
| Publisher | Taylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/03050629.2020.1688804 |
| OpenAlex | W2983162694 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 31 |
The management of maritime claims is becoming an important issue in the study of interstate conflict. Since World War II, most contested maritime claims have been associated with low-level conflict (mainly shows of force, or what we call maritime provocations) and have not resulted in fatalities. However, what is puzzling is that many competing claims are also associated with states that are alliance partners. To explain this puzzle, we trace the management of maritime claims to states’ participation in different types of security institutions. We argue that joint membership in highly institutionalized security organizations, namely defensive alliances, provides aggrieved challenger states with the opportunity to undermine the position of defending states by using low-level maritime provocations. The alliance has an incentive to provide an institutional security umbrella to maintain its organization’s strength and continuity. High levels of commitment to defensive alliances provide a challenger state with the opportunity to behave provocatively without risking an escalation of the conflict or severely damaging its reputation within the alliance. We test our theory using data on all maritime claims and their associated militarization attempts in the Western Hemisphere and Europe from 1900 to 2001 from the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) project
Alliance · Business · Economics · Incentive · Maritime Security · Market economy · Militarization · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Position (finance · Reputation · State (computer science · International Maritime Law Issues · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Maritime Security and History
International Military Alliances, 1648-2008
The Territorial Peace
Clarify
The Origins of Alliances
The MID 3 data set, 1993–2001
An Economic Theory of Alliances
Bones of democratic contention
The MID4 dataset, 2002–2010
The MID3 Data Set, 1993—2001
From territorial claims to identity claims
Trading Data
Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions, 1815-1944
Power at Sea
Ruling the Sea
Searching for Sanctuary
Theory, Data, and Deterrence
Dangerous Alliances
Do AlliancesReallyDeter
Conflict Management in Land, River, and Maritime Claims
Heterogeneity in the Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs), 1816–2001
Bones of Contention
Signing Up for Peace
Beyond Territorial Contiguity
Contentious Issues and World Politics
Perverse Institutionalism
Alliances, Internal Information, and Military Conflict Among Member-States
Alliances
International Institutions and Compliance with Agreements
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,8 |
| Citation span | 2021 - 2026 (6) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |