Slavery and Just Compensation in American Constitutionalism

Bibliographic Data

ID12176176
AuthorsStephan Stohler (0000-0002-9832-274X, North Central College, corresponding author)
Year2018
Volume44
Issue1
Pages102-135
Publication date2018-01-26
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueLaw & Social Inquiry (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0897-6546 • E-ISSN: 1747-4469
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/lsi.12351
OpenAlexW2793338509
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited55

The existence of compensation clauses, guaranteeing compensation when governments took private property, in antebellum state constitutions varied considerably across states and over time. Existing explanations struggle to account for such variation. I argue that slavery had an important, though varied, influence, depending on the changing strategic behavior of proslavery constitutional drafters. Proslavery delegates opposed compensation when they expected to control political decision making, but supported compensation when uncertain. This argument identifies another way that slavery impacted US constitutional development, and further suggests that American rights development resembles the experiences of other countries where elite interests were threatened

Action (physics · Compensation (psychology · Computer security · Constitutionalism · Content (measure theory · Democracy · Law and economics · Physics · Political science · Sociology · American Constitutional Law and Politics · Computer Science · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Legal and Constitutional Studies · Mathematics · Psychology · Social Psychology