East European protest politics in the early 1990s

Comparative trends and preliminary theories

Bibliographic Data

ID12299251
AuthorsPieter Vanhuysse (0000-0001-6496-8959, corresponding author)
Year2004
Volume56
Issue3
Pages421-438
Publication date2004-05-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueEurope Asia Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0966-8136 • E-ISSN: 1465-3427
PublisherRoutledge (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/09668130410001682708
OpenAlexW2133590228
LanguageEN
Citations received6
References cited32

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes To name just a few countries, between 1976 and 1992 there were riots against IMF‐induced austerity programmes in Venezuela in 1989, in Peru in almost every year between 1976 and 1985, in Bolivia in every year between 1983 and 1987, in the Dominican Republic in 1984, 1985 and 1987, in Brazil in 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1987, and in Argentina for each year between 1982 and 1985 and again in 1989. Similar protest waves occurred in Africa (Greskovits, Citation1998, p. 193; Walton & Seddon, Citation1994, pp. 39–40). These scenarios were repeated since 2001 in democracies such as Argentina and Venezuela, again with the effect of weakening democratic rule. I thank Máte Szábo for making these yearly reports available to me. They were drawn up by Virág (Citation1996), Kovács (Citation1996), Mezei (Citation1996), Füzér (Citation1996), E. Szabó (Citation1996), Péchy (Citation1996) and M. Szabó (Citation1996). Ekiert & Kubik instructed teams of local researchers in Hungary, Poland, East Germany and Slovakia to code protest events as reported in a number of daily and weekly national newspapers according to uniform definitions and methodology. While their database is one of the most informative sources on post‐communist protests to date, it has to be borne in mind that this is a relative virtue due to the lack of better data. Ekiert & Kubik (Citation1999) acknowledge that protest event analysis based on press sources is not without pitfalls. For instance, they point out that the high and variable amount of missing data did not allow rigorous statistical analysis (p. 17). For a discussion see Kramer (Citation2002a, Citation2002b) and Ekiert & Kubik (Citation2002). Kramer mentions, for instance, that the Ekiert & Kubik data are based on a relatively small number of newspaper sources, which, in the case of Poland, were all published in the capital, Warsaw. Ekiert & Kubik's (Citation1998a, Citationb) data for the year 1994 were incomplete and have been omitted here. The authors also present data on the former East Germany, which are not considered here because of the idiosyncratic nature of the East German transition. There, however, violence was a much more prevalent feature of protest politics. The notion of protest event here is defined broadly, to cover all types of institutionalised and unconventional collective public action. To be included, an action had to be (a) reported in at least one newspaper, (b) undertaken by at least three people or be extreme (e.g. self‐immolation, terror, hunger strike) and (c) articulate specific demands in a non‐routine way (Ekiert & Kubik, Citation1999, pp. 13–18). As with the press‐based data discussed above (note 3), it is again important to note that the virtue of these ILO data is due largely to the lack of better‐quality data. Since the ILO data come from several sources (including strike notices, newspaper reports and direct inquiries addressed to employers' or workers' organisations), definitions are not perfectly comparable across countries. Data on strikes and lockouts are covered together because most countries do not distinguish between these actions (ILO, Citation1997, p. 273). Peru and Brazil were still fully in the process of democratic consolidation in the 1980s, having experienced their transition respectively in 1980 and in 1985. Peru's first two democratic governments implemented populist policies, experiencing annual average GDP growth rates of respectively −2.8% and −2.3% and annual average inflation rates of 108% and 2,465%. Brazil's first two democratic governments experienced annual average GDP growth rates of respectively 2.5% and −0.9% and annual average inflation rates of 806% and 1,463%. Colombia and Venezuela, by contrast, were generally considered to be established democracies in the 1980s. Venezuela experienced a debt crisis in February 1983, which led to an austerity programme without fiscal reforms. During 1980–84 annual average GDP growth stood at −2.4% and annual average inflation at 13%. Taking office in 1984, president Lusinchi undertook stabilisation plans that included subsidy cuts and investment reductions. During 1985–88 average annual GDP growth stood at 4% and annual inflation at 22%. Colombia, lastly, experienced only a short, mildly populist episode from 1982 to 1984; generally the country experienced excellent macroeconomic indicators in the 1980s and underwent no austere structural reforms (Przeworski, 1991, p. 184; Haggard & Kaufman, Citation1992, pp. 285–286; Bresser Pereira et al., Citation1993, pp. 20, 37–48). For Western studies see e.g. Sherman Grant II & Wallace (Citation1991, p. 1134), Gobeyn (Citation1993, p. 76) and Sandoval (Citation1998, pp. 175, 187). For East European studies relying on this measure see Ekiert & Kubik (Citation1998a, p. 96; 1999, p. 118). By contrast, Kubik (Citation1998) and Seleny (Citation1999) rely on a still more problematic measure for our purposes, namely industrial action standardised by the size of the entire population, which includes sub‐groups with near‐zero levels of industrial action such as children and the elderly. A potential drawback should be noted regarding the present method of standardising for the size of the working‐age population, when compared with a method of standardising for the number of wage earners (but not when compared with a method of standardising for the size of the labour force). The first way of measuring industrial action might produce an underestimate, because it includes the unemployed in the denominator. It is plausible to assume that this group is likely to be comparatively less able to engage in disruptive collective action (Vanhuysse, Citation2003). It is therefore advisable to combine a discussion of the working‐age adjusted measure of industrial action with a discussion of changes in both the size of the labour force and, within it, in the size of the unemployment pool. The data reported are averages of all the available 'democratic' data points: 1980, 1985, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1995 in Peru, 1985 in Brazil, 1985, 1990, 1991, 1992 and 1993 in Colombia and 1980 in Venezuela. For 1980 and 1985 the protest data (in thousands) were divided by the population (in millions) aged 15–64 in 1980; for the years thereafter the data were divided by the population aged 15–64 in 1994. Over the period considered, population growth in Latin America was generally faster than in the East European and Western democracies discussed above, which makes the figures for Latin America comparatively less reliable. Data on strikes and lockouts for Colombia include public services and illegal stoppages. For Peru from 1994 they cover strikes only and the private sector only. For Brazil they cover strikes only. For comparison, the same indicator of worker participation stood at 1 in pre‐democratic Brazil in 1980 and at 6.1 in democratic Peru between 1991 and 1995. The data reported are averages of all the available 'democratic' data points: 1980, 1985, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1995 in Peru, 1985, 1990, 1991, 1992 and 1994 in Brazil, 1985, 1990, 1991, 1992 and 1993 in Colombia and 1980 in Venezuela. For 1980 and 1985 the protest data (in thousands) were divided by the population (in millions) aged 15–64 in 1980; for the years thereafter the data were divided by the population aged 15–64 in 1994. For comparison, the same indicator of workdays lost stood at 1.1 in Brazil in 1980 and at 29.2 in Peru between 1991 and 1995. The data reported are averages of all the available 'democratic' data points: 1980, 1985, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1995 in Peru, 1985 in Brazil and 1980 in Venezuela. No data were available for Colombia. For 1980 and 1985 the protest data were divided by the population aged 15–64 in 1980; for the years thereafter the data were divided by the population aged 15–64 in 1994. Data on strikes and lockouts for Colombia include public services and illegal stoppages. For Peru from 1994 they cover strikes only and the private sector only. For Brazil they cover strikes only. See also Vanhuysse (Citation2002a) and Kramer (Citation2002a). The latter, reviewing the empirical literature on Western Europe (p. 218), similarly finds that key periods in Western Europe were marked by higher levels of protest than those cited by Ekiert & Kubik for post‐communist Poland—indeed 'several times higher in some cases, with a far greater incidence of violence'. For case studies on union behaviour across the region see Crowley & Ost (Citation2001), for a review see Pop & Vanhuysse (Citation2004). On Poland see furthermore Osa (Citation1998), Ekiert & Kubik (Citation1998a) and Kramer (Citation2002a, Citation2002b). On Hungary see Virág (Citation1996), Kovács (Citation1996), Mezei (Citation1996), Füzér (Citation1996), E. Szabó (Citation1996), Péchy (Citation1996) and M. Szabó (Citation1996, Citation2000). For theoretical accounts of protests in the former USSR see Crowley (Citation1997) and Ashwin (Citation1998). For similar arguments see also Ekiert & Kubik (Citation1999) and Kubik (Citation1998). The term opportunity structure refers to Tarrow (Citation1998), who identifies four distinct dimensions of change in the polity that may constitute an opening of the 'political opportunity structures' (Tarrow, Citation1998, p. 86): (a) the opening up of access to participation; (b) the availability of influential allies; (c) shifts in ruling alignments and (d) cleavages within and among elites. Building on these notions, Ekiert & Kubik (1998b, pp. 572–573) argue that during transition all four dimensions were in flux, creating an 'unstructured opportunity' or 'too much freedom' for people to protest, which in turn 'demobilised' them. Kubik (Citation1998, pp. 141–142) himself observes so much. Of course, as elsewhere, limitations on the conditions for calling strikes do exist, for instance regarding prior notice periods or special groups such as the military and the police (Casale, Citation1997, pp. 4–10). But these are not overly restrictive, nor are they mentioned by Ekiert & Kubik as reasons for the low incidence of protests. Ekiert & Kubik (Citation1998b, pp. 576, 581) further reduce their theory's parsimony by adding another layer of explanatory variables, namely the 'resources' available to mobilising groups, meant 'in a broad sense—that is, including traditions, symbols, and discourses alongside material and organisational elements'. Seleny (Citation1999) similarly adds cultural, traditional and discourse attitude variables to a broadly corporatist framework, arguing (pp. 497–498) that Hungarian protest politics differed from those in Poland because the former country had a 'pragmatic‐consensual' and the latter a 'moral‐confrontational' culture of party competition, dating back to the pre‐transition period. Of course, strictly speaking, the two claims are distinct and do not necessarily contradict each other: a country with a well‐established tradition of street demonstrations may still lack a tradition of political violence. But the two theories do present these two factors as part of the same overall crisis‐proof tendency of East European democracies, and they do not themselves make any such distinction

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