Social spending targets in IMF concessional lending
US domestic politics and the institutional foundations of rapid operational change
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12315738 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Liam Clegg (0000-0002-0773-5988, University of York, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2014 |
| Volume | 21 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 735-763 |
| Publication date | 2014-01-16 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Review of International Political Economy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0969-2290 • E-ISSN: 1466-4526 |
| Publisher | Routledge (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/09692290.2013.833958 |
| OpenAlex | W2064976627 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 10 |
| References cited | 62 |
This paper contributes to the literature on the mechanics of change in global economic governance. By synthesising an empirically driven case study with conceptual insights from the existing literature, I highlight three intervening variables that enabled the Legislative Mandates passed by the US Congress in 2009 on the use of social-spending targets (education and health expenditure ring fences) in IMF concessional lending to be rapidly translated into operational change. The intervening variables that stood between US domestic action and rapid operational change are: first, the existence of effective enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance from the US Executive Director with the Mandate; second, preference congruence between other primary principals and the content of the Mandate, and; third, the existence of effective enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance from IMF staff with the principals’ collectively-sanctioned goal. The outcome observed – the near universal incorporation of social-spending targets into concessional lending arrangements – adds credence to calls for further empirical work to assess the extent of a post-Washington Consensus transition at the IMF
Business · Conditionality · Corporate governance · Creditor · Debt · Economics · Enforcement · Macroeconomics · Mandate · Political science · Politics · Public economics · International Development and Aid · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Social Policy and Reform Studies · Accounting · Finance
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| Unique citing works | 10 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,91 |
| Citation span | 2015 - 2026 (12) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 9 |