Is firm-sponsored training a palliative? A common agency approach
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 19087111 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Hejer Lasram (0000-0003-2608-070X, corresponding author), Didier Laussel (0000-0002-1590-493X), Didier G Laussel |
| Year | 2016 |
| Volume | 48 |
| Issue | 57 |
| Pages | 5581-5592 |
| Publication date | 2016-05-24 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Applied Economics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0003-6846 • E-ISSN: 1466-4283 |
| Publisher | Taylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/00036846.2016.1181830 |
| OpenAlex | W2401655175 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 13 |
We analyse the issue of firm-sponsored training under product market imperfections. In this setting, qualification becomes a public good for firms when their profits are increasing in the stock of skilled workers but remains a private good to students/workers. Students have to pay a tuition fee but at the same time firms sponsor education: universities sell training to both. We prove that the proportion of skilled workers is larger in more competitive economies/industries while the share of firms in the financing of training is a monotonically decreasing function of the degree of competition. An increase of the latter indeed increases the equilibrium skilled wage while reducing its sensitivity to an increase of the supply of skilled workers. The firms’ aggregate expenditures on training per worker are nevertheless a nonmonotonic function of the competitiveness of the economy
Business · Economics · Labour economics · Microeconomics · Product market · Wage · Economic Policies and Impacts · Merger and Competition Analysis · Politics, Economics, and Education Policy
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |