Callousness as a kind of moral wrongdoing in humor
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21395056 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Paul Butterfield (0000-0002-9701-7743, Division of Human Studies Alfred University Alfred New York USA, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Publication date | 2025-09-10 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Southern Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0038-4283 • E-ISSN: 2041-6962 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/sjp.70021 |
| OpenAlex | W4414092458 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 17 |
This article considers the options for moral criticism of joking speech. It denies that it is always appropriate to say, of socially offensive jokers, that they must have malicious intentions or bigoted beliefs—and, in the absence of this kind of claim, it searches for a more appropriate criticism of offensive humor. Ultimately, the article identifies callousness as the moral charge that can fairly be leveled at offensive jokers when they do not tell their jokes maliciously. Speakers who tell unflattering jokes about social groups are risking the reputation of their targets in order to induce comic amusement amongst their audiences. In doing so, these jokers can demonstrate a callous disregard for the esteem in which their targets are held by others
Amusement · Comics · Criticism · Hypocrisy · Offensive · Order (exchange) · Reputation · Wrongdoing · Humor Studies and Applications · Language, Metaphor, and Cognition · Swearing, Euphemism, Multilingualism
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |