Are dream emotions fitting

Bibliographic Data

ID21591925
AuthorsM Rosen (0000-0002-7545-5558, Trent University), Marina Trakas (0000-0001-6977-140X, Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas, corresponding author)
Year2025
Volume38
Issue6
Pages2637-2667
Publication date2025-08-18
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophical Psychology (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0951-5089 • E-ISSN: 1465-394X
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/09515089.2024.2350500
OpenAlexW4399029712
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited97

When we dream, we feel emotions in response to objects and events that exist only in the dream. One key question is whether these emotions can be said to be “essentially unfitting”, that is, always inappropriate to the evoking scenario. However, how we evaluate dream emotions for fittingness may depend on the model of dreams we adopt: the imagination or the hallucination model. If fittingness requires a match between emotion and evaluative properties of objects or events, it is prima facie plausible that dream emotions could fail to fit under the imagination model because it is unfitting to have an emotion toward an object we do not believe to be real. Under the hallucination model, dream emotions could be unfitting because their objects do not exist but we believe them to be real. More nuance, however, is required. By comparing dream emotions with the emotions we experience while imagining, engaging with fiction, and hallucinating, we conclude that although there are compelling arguments in support of the claim that dream emotions are essentially unfitting, these arguments are not entirely convincing, and it is more plausible that particular dream emotions can be assessed for fittingness under either model of dreaming

Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Dream · Psychoanalysis · Mind wandering and attention · Neuroscience · Psychology · Sleep and related disorders · Sleep and Wakefulness Research · Social Psychology