Is health philosophically distinctive
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21592007 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Kengo Miyazono (0000-0003-4093-6877, Hokkaido University, corresponding author), Tamaki Komada (Hokkaido University) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 38 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 994-1005 |
| Publication date | 2025-04-03 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophical Psychology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0951-5089 • E-ISSN: 1465-394X |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/09515089.2024.2379997 |
| OpenAlex | W4400929087 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 8 |
This commentary critically examines Barnes’ ameliorative skepticism about health, which is a distinctive form of skepticism. While we agree with Barnes that health is indeed messy, involving biological, normative, societal, and phenomenological factors in a complex manner that defies simplistic explanation, we do not think that health is messy in a distinctive way. We argue that health is in fact remarkably similar to another messy phenomenon that is familiar to philosophers (i.e. truth), and that an existing philosophical account of another messy phenomenon (i.e. pluralism about truth) can be applied to health
Cognitive science · Epistemology · Complementary and Alternative Medicine Studies · Empathy and Medical Education · Mental Health and Psychiatry · Philosophy · Psychology
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |