What Phenomenal Contrast for Bodily Ownership

Bibliographic Data

ID21876496
AuthorsFrédérique de Vignemont (0009-0006-1354-1553, corresponding author)
Year2020
Volume6
Issue1
Pages117-137
Publication date2020-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of the American Philosophical Association (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 2053-4477 • E-ISSN: 2053-4485
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/apa.2019.34
OpenAlexW3013660753
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited42

In a 1962 article, ‘On Sensations of Position’, G. E. M. Anscombe claimed that we do not feel our legs crossed; we simply know that they are that way. What about the sense of bodily ownership? Do we directly know that this body is our own, or do we know it because we feel this body that way? One may claim, for instance, that we are we aware that this is our own body thanks to our bodily experiences that ascribe the property of myness to the body that they represent. Here I approach this issue from the perspective of the debate on the admissible content of perception, appealing to the method of phenomenal contrast. After rejecting the myness hypothesis, I criticize alternative accounts of the contrast in somatosensory, cognitive, and agentive terms. I conclude that the phenomenology of ownership consists in the affective awareness of the unique significance of the body for survival

Cognitive psychology · Epistemology · Mind–body problem · Perception · Physical body · Body Image and Dysmorphia Studies · Computer Science · Pain Management and Placebo Effect · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology · Virtual Reality Applications and Impacts