Hiding behind the curtain
Performance information and public officials’ policy instrument preferences in visible and invisible domains
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 22235486 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Zengqiang Qin (0000-0002-1910-8738, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics), Jinfeng Zhang (0000-0001-8131-552X, Chongqing University), Bingsheng Liu (0000-0002-8663-8026, Chongqing University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 12 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Publication date | 2025-09-24 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Humanities and Social Sciences Communications (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 2662-9992 • E-ISSN: 2662-9992 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1057/s41599-025-05636-8 |
| OpenAlex | W4414458269 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 73 |
This paper examines how performance information affects public officials’ preferences for policy instruments in visible public goods (e.g., above-ground roads and parks) and invisible public goods (e.g., below-ground sewage systems) domains. Using a survey experiment with 1171 Chinese public officials, we find that in the visible domain, regardless of performance information, public officials prefer market-oriented indirect policy instruments (e.g., outsourcing) over government-oriented direct policy instruments (e.g., direct government provision), suggesting that avoiding blame is key motivations for understanding their policy preferences. In contrast, performance information plays a limited role in the invisible domain, with public officials prioritizing effectiveness and legitimacy in their choice of instruments. These findings suggest that performance management systems alone may not be sufficient to incentivize proactive governance. Thus, there is a need for balanced accountability mechanisms that encourage the implementation of appropriate instruments in different policy areas to achieve policy goals
Accountability · Blame · Legitimacy · Public good · Public policy · E-Government and Public Services · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Public Policy and Administration Research
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The Tools of Government in the Digital Age
The Politics of Bureaucracy
Bureaucracy in a Democratic State
“Fragmented Authoritarianism 2.0”
Political turnover and economic performance
Prospect Theory
Encourage or impede? The relationship between trust in government and coproduction
Decision makers’ preferences of policy instruments
Effectiveness and synergies of policy instruments for land use governance in tropical regions
Why are policy innovations rare and so often negative? Blame avoidance and problem denial in climate change policy-making
Democracy, visibility and public good provision
Public Values and Public Service Motivation
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Administrative Behavior
Information use in public administration and policy decision‐making
Citizen (Dis)satisfaction
Broadcasting good news and learning from bad news
Prospect theory and public service outcomes
How bureaucrats shape political decisions
Policy instruments at work
How policy instruments are chosen
Formal and Real Authority in Organizations
What Do Bureaucrats Like Doing? Bureaucratic Preferences in Response to Institutional Reform
Bureaucratic response to performance information
The Effect of Beliefs on Policy Instrument Preferences
Does public officials' risk preference differ in self versus public decision‐making? It depends on decision framing and bet size
Performance Management Meets Red Tape
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Democracy, policy, and inequality
The lessons of failure
The Selection of Policy Instruments
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The effect of psychological bias on public officials’ attitudes towards the implementation of policy instruments
Instruments of Government
The Politics of Blame Avoidance
Hybrid Governance and the Attribution of Political Responsibility
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Positivity and Negativity Dominance in Citizen Assessments of Intergovernmental Sustainability Performance
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How Do Politicians Attribute Bureaucratic Responsibility for Performance? Negativity Bias and Interest Group Advocacy
Performance Information, Blame Avoidance, and Politicians' Attitudes to Spending and Reform
Performance Measures and Democracy
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Whoever Has Will be Given More
Motivated Reasoning about Public Performance
Acceptance or Disapproval
The Effect of Public Service Motivation and Job Level on Bureaucrats’ Preferences for Direct Policy Instruments
When Politics Matters
Decentralization, local information, and effort substitution
Information Dilemmas and Blame‐Avoidance Strategies
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Distributive Politics Around the World
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The Study of Administration
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |