On Scope Relations between Quantifiers and Epistemic Modals

Bibliographic Data

ID22882000
AuthorsEarl Swanson (0000-0003-1337-4047, University of Michigan, corresponding author)
Year2010
Volume27
Issue4
Pages529-540
Publication date2010-11-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Semantics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0167-5133 • E-ISSN: 1477-4593
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1093/jos/ffq010
OpenAlexW2007422360
LanguageEN
Citations received8
References cited14

This article presents and discusses a range of counterexamples to the common view that quantifiers cannot take scope over epistemic modals. Some of the counterexamples raise problems for ‘force modifier’ theories of epistemic modals. Some of the counterexamples raise problems for Robert Stalnaker's theory of counterfactuals, according to which a special kind of epistemic modal must be able to scope over a whole counterfactual. Finally, some of the counterexamples suggest that David Lewis must countenance ‘would’ counterfactuals in which a covert ‘would’ scopes over the whole consequent of the counterfactual, including an overt ‘might’.

Counterexample · Counterfactual conditional · Counterfactual thinking · Covert · Discrete mathematics · Epistemology · Linguistics · Metaphysics · Modal verb · Philosophy of language · Programming language · Scope (computer science) · Verb · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Syntax, Semantics, Linguistic Variation