The beliefs of a Pyrrhonist

Bibliographic Data

ID23137344
AuthorsJonathan Barnes (0000-0001-6311-1435, corresponding author)
Year1982
Volume28
Pages1-29
Publication date1982-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueProceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0068-6735 • E-ISSN: 2053-5899
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0068673500004375
OpenAlexW2326757816
LanguageEN
Citations received37
References cited5

A Pyrrhonist's researches do not end in discovery; nor yet do they conclude that discovery is impossible. For they do not terminate at all: the researches continue ( PH 1.1, 4), and the researcher finds himself in a condition of ἐποχή ( PH 1.7). Έποχή is defined as ‘a standstill of the intellect, as a result of which we neither deny nor affirm anything’ ( PH 1.10). The Sceptical investigator neither asserts nor denies, neither believes nor disbelieves. Έποχή is characteristically produced by argument - indeed, one of the most refreshing features of the Pyrrhonist tracts of Sextus Empiricus is that they are stuffed full of argumentation. When a philosopher offers us an argument, he normally implies that, if we accept the premisses, we ought to accept the conclusion. It is thus natural to suppose that a Pyrrhonist's arguments similarly imply an intellectual ought : ‘Consider these premisses’, the Sceptic urges, ‘and you will see that you should suspend judgement’. A few Pyrrhonian passages do indeed contain such an intellectual ought ; but those passages are, I think, misleading. Sextus usually says, not ‘you should suspend judgement’, but ‘you will (or: must ) suspend judgement’.

Argument (complex analysis) · Argumentation theory · Epistemology · Intellect · Judgement · Natural (archaeology) · Skepticism · Classical Philosophy and Thought · History · Medicine · Philosophy