Fitting Attitudes, Finkish Goods, and Value Appearances
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23159374 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Graham Oddie (0000-0002-9934-246X, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Pages | 74-101 |
| Publication date | 2016-09-08 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | CHAPTER |
| Venue | Oxford Studies in Metaethics 11 (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198784647.003.0004 |
| OpenAlex | W2521224812 |
| ISBN | 9780198784647 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
According to Fitting Attitude theorists, for something to possess a certain value it is necessary and sufficient that it be fitting (appropriate, or good, or obligatory, or something) to take a certain attitude to the bearer of that value. The idea seems obvious for thick evaluative attributes, but less obvious for the thin evaluative attributesâ like goodness, betterness, and degrees of value. This paper is an extended argument for the thesis that the fitting response to the thin evaluative attributes of states is desire, broadly construed. The good is what it is fitting to desire, the bad what it is fitting to be averse to, and the better what it is fitting to prefer. I start with two prominent challenges to the FA schema (Wrong Kinds of Reasons and Solitary Goods). For the FA schema to survive these challengesâ along with some developments of themâ the fitting response to the goodness of a state has to be a non-factive, non-doxastic representation of the state as goodâ in other words, an appearance of the goodness that state. That desires and preferences are non-doxastic value appearances is independently attractive, and I argue that this is in fact the simplest hypothesis compatible with the Fitting Attitude approach.Fitting Attitudes
Doxastic logic · Epistemology · Goodness of fit · Machine learning · Political science · Representation (politics) · Schema (genetic algorithms) · Statistics · Value (mathematics) · American Constitutional Law and Politics · Computer Science · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Mathematics · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology · Social Psychology
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,44 |
| Citation span | 2017 - 2023 (7) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |