Generalized Utilitarianism and Harsanyi's Impartial Observer Theorem

Bibliographic Data

ID23161908
AuthorsSimon Grant (0000-0002-9543-8536, The University of Queensland), Atsushi Kajii (0000-0002-2497-522X, Kyoto University), Ben Polak (Yale University), Zvi Safra (0000-0001-9899-1487, University of Exeter)
Year2010
Volume78
Issue6
Pages1939-1971
Publication date2010-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueEconometrica (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0012-9682 • E-ISSN: 1468-0262
PublisherThe Econometric Society (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.3982/ecta6712
OpenAlexW2098796958
LanguageEN
Citations received15
References cited14

Harsanyi's impartial observer must consider two types of lotteries: imaginary identity lotteries (“accidents of birth”) that she faces as herself and the real outcome lotteries (“life chances”) to be faced by the individuals she imagines becoming. If we maintain a distinction between identity and outcome lotteries, then Harsanyi-like axioms yield generalized utilitarianism, and allow us to accommodate concerns about different individuals' risk attitudes and concerns about fairness. Requiring an impartial observer to be indifferent as to which individual should face similar risks restricts her social welfare function, but still allows her to accommodate fairness. Requiring an impartial observer to be indifferent between identity and outcome lotteries, however, forces her to ignore both fairness and different risk attitudes, and yields a new axiomatization of Harsanyi's utilitarianism.

Axiom · Economics · Identity (music) · Lottery · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Observer (physics) · Outcome (game theory) · Political science · Utilitarianism · Welfare · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Mathematics · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics