The Epistemic Role of Consciousness
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23398407 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Declan Smithies (0000-0002-6489-8580, Professor of Philosophy, Ohio State University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Pages | 424 |
| Publication date | 2019-10-31 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | BOOK |
| Venue | Epistemic Role of Consciousness (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | Oxford University PressNew York (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/oso/9780199917662.001.0001 |
| OpenAlex | W2969564117 |
| Open Library | OL28895227M |
| ISBN | 9780199917662 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 94 |
| References cited | 94 |
What is the role of consciousness in our mental lives? This book argues that consciousness plays an essential role in explaining how we can acquire knowledge and epistemically justified belief about ourselves and our surroundings. On this view, our mental lives cannot be preserved in unconscious creatures—zombies—who behave just as we do. Only conscious creatures have epistemic justification to form beliefs about the world. Zombies cannot know anything about the world, since they have no epistemic justification to believe anything. On this view, all epistemic justification depends ultimately on consciousness. This book builds a sustained argument for the epistemic role of phenomenal consciousness, which draws on a range of considerations in epistemology and the philosophy of mind. The book is divided into two parts, which approach the theory of epistemic justification from opposite directions. Part I argues from the bottom up by drawing on considerations in the philosophy of mind about the role of consciousness in mental representation, perception, cognition, and introspection. Part II argues from the top down by arguing from general principles in epistemology about the nature of epistemic justification. These mutually reinforcing arguments form the basis for a unified theory of the epistemic role of phenomenal consciousness, one that bridges the gap between epistemology and the philosophy of mind.
Argument (complex analysis) · Cognition · Consciousness · Creatures · Electromagnetic theories of consciousness · Epistemology · Introspection · Mental representation · Metaphysics · Natural (archaeology) · Philosophy of mind · Physicalism · Unconscious mind · Cognitive Science and Education Research · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Misinformation and Its Impacts · Philosophy · Psychology
The Sublime of Consciousness
Misleading Higher-Order Evidence and Rationality
The experience requirement on well-being
How Seriously Should We Take AI Welfare? Constraints From the Epistemology of Consciousness
On the Epistemic Value of Reflection
Desire-Based Theories of Reasons and the Guise of the Good
Having Things in View
Consciousness is Sublime
Akrasia and Epistemic Impurism
Against an Epistemic Argument for Mineness
Husserl and the Epistemic Force of Perceptual Givenness
Institutional Review Boards and Public Justification
A metacognitive account of phenomenal force
Successful Intuition vs. Intellectual Hallucination
In Defense of Cognitive Phenomenology
How to Know That You’re Not a Zombie
Taking Skepticism Seriously
Single Premise Deduction and Defeat
Hope, Worry, and Suspension of Judgment
Credence
Thoroughly Modest Believing
Does Cognitive Phenomenology Support Dualism
Agency and Objectivity
The Epistemic Insignificance of Moral Encroachment
Gettier and the a priori
Permissivism and self‐fulfilling propositions
How to Think About Tacit (or Implicit) Beliefs
Epistemic Cans
Methodological worries for humean arguments from evil
Being in a position to know
Akratic (epistemic) modesty
Even if it might not be true, evidence cannot be false
The nature and value of firsthand insight
Justification as a dimension of rationality
Real and ideal rationality
The ins and outs of conscious belief
Epistemology without guidance
Unconscious perception and central coordinating agency
Transitional attitudes and the unmooring view of higher‐order evidence
Degrees of consciousness
Center indifference and skepticism
Are reasons normatively basic
Welfare and Felt Duration
Epistemic akrasia
Appreciating the need for autonomy, or recognizing the truth of evidentialism
The epistemic import of phenomenal consciousness
Joint attention and communication
Distinguishing knowledge from knowledge Ω
Dispensing with experiential acquaintance
The Limited Phenomenal Infallibility thesis
Knowledge and the Onslaught of Desire
A Hedonic Theory of Desire
Cognitive Penetration
Sentience, Vulcans, and zombies
Semantic compositionality and Berkeley's divine language argument
Hidden grounds of religious hinge commitments
Neural decoding, the Atlantis machine, and zombies
Pro tem rationality
Can AI Believe
The Problem of Introspective Blink
The Evil Demon Inside
Replies to Feldman, Greco, and Malmgren
Knowledge‐by‐Acquaintance First
Accessibilism without consciousness
The epistemic insignificance of phenomenal force
Beliefs as dispositions to make judgments
Why Mary left her room
Perspectives and good dispositions
Once more, without feeling
Indecision and Buridan’s Principle
Perceptual justification and objectual attitudes
Blindsight, blandsight, and blingsight
Polarization is epistemically innocuous
Cogito and Moore
Does rationality demand higher-order certainty
Perceptual capacities, discrimination, and the senses
Conciliationism and the Peer-undermining Problem
Against overconfidence
Delusions and madmen
The puzzle of defeated suspension
The neurotic and the dogmatist
Are there epistemic conditions necessary for demonstrative thought
On the relationship between epistemology and science
The Sellarsian dilemma and McDowell’s solution to it
Fitting anxiety and prudent anxiety
Knowledge is closed under analytic content
Rescuing a traditional argument for internalism
Moral encroachment and group-to-individual inferences
On Being Debased’
Introspecting bias
The Cogito and sums
Iteration Principles in Epistemology I
On the Epistemic Significance of Perceptual Structure
Evidentialism and Epistemic Duties to Inquire
Are Epistemic Concepts Reducible to Ethical Concepts?
Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology
Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge
Do Conscious Thoughts Cause Behavior?
Metaphysical Dependence
Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?
Acting Contrary to Our Professed Beliefs or the Gulf Between Occurrent Judgment and Dispositional Belief
On a confusion about a function of consciousness
Cartesian Skepticism and Inference to the Best Explanation
Sympathy and callousness
Tracking multiple independent targets
A Puzzle about Belief
Peer Disagreement and Higher‐Order Evidence
Methodological solipsism considered as a research strategy in cognitive psychology
What is Justified Belief?
The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief
Relative blindsight in normal observers and the neural correlate of visual consciousness
On What Grounds What
Materialism and Qualia
How we know our minds
Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience
Telling more than we can know
Inferential Appearances
Replies to Critics
What Is the Role of Consciousness in Demonstrative Thought?
The Representational Character of Experience
Basic Self-Knowledge
How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Probability 1
Introspective Knowledge of Negative Facts
Why Open-Minded People Should Endorse Dogmatism
Bootstrapping, Defeasible Reasoning, and a Priori Justification
The Arationality of Perception
Methodological reflections on current linguistic theory
Is phenomenal force sufficient for immediate perceptual justification
What Conditional Probability Could Not Be
Ideal rationality and logical omniscience
Peer Disagreement, Evidence, and Well-Groundedness
Justified Belief and Epistemically Responsible Action
Epistemology of Disagreement
The Lottery Paradox, Knowledge, and Rationality
Nonconceptual Content and the “Space of Reasons”
Regularity and Hyperreal Credences
Consciousness and Criterion
Moore’s Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification
The Anna Karenina Principle and Skepticism about Unconscious Perception
Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzle about Rationality
Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat
On the Relationship between Propositional and Doxastic Justification
Transparency, Intentionalism, and the Nature of Perceptual Content
Thoughts Without Distinctive Non-Imagistic Phenomenology
Perception and the Reach of Phenomenal Content
The Significance of Cognitive Phenomenology
Defeaters and Higher-Level Requirements
| Unique citing works | 94 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 8,55 |
| Citation span | 2015 - 2026 (12) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 94 |