Bureaucratic Interests and the Outsourcing of Security

The Privatization of Diplomatic Protection in the United States and the United Kingdom

Bibliographic Data

ID2340926
AuthorsEugenio Cusumano (0000-0002-7349-6639, Baltic Defence College), C Kinsey (0000-0002-6819-4767, King's College London)
Year2015
Volume41
Issue4
Pages591-615
Publication date2015-10-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueArmed Forces & Society (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0095-327X • E-ISSN: 1556-0848
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0095327x14523958
OpenAlexW2149083166
LanguageEN
Citations received8

In spite of its sensitivity, diplomatic protection has received very sporadic scholarly attention. This article provides a comparative analysis of US and UK diplomatic security policies, focusing on the increasing use of private military and security companies (PMSCs) for the protection of foreign service and development agencies' personnel. The existing theoretical explanations of the privatization of security tasks cannot explain why countries displaying similar material incentives and similar political and market cultures have outsourced diplomatic protection to different degrees, nor can they account for variance in the use of PMSCs by different agencies within the same country. Our analysis highlights the importance of investigating organizations' interests in providing a more accurate explanation of the varying propensity to outsource armed protection. In both the United States and the United Kingdom, the outsourcing of diplomatic security was a resultant of foreign policy bureaucracies and military organizations' preferences

Bureaucracy · Business · Economics · Incentive · International trade · Market economy · Outsourcing · Political science · Politics · Service (business) · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies · International Law and Human Rights · Law · Marketing · Military and Defense Studies · Public Administration