Norm Enforcement
The Role of Third Parties
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 24041237 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jeffrey P Carpenter (0000-0003-0969-5876), Peter Hans Matthews (0000-0003-0412-9437) |
| Year | 2010 |
| Volume | 166 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 239-258 |
| Publication date | 2010-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0932-4569 • E-ISSN: 1614-0559 |
| Publisher | Mohr Siebeck (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1628/093245610791343003 |
| OpenAlex | W2028742909 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 4 |
To be effective, norm enforcement often requires the participation of unaffected third parties. The logic of third-party intervention has, however, proven elusive because the costs always seem to outweigh the benefits. Using an evolutionary game theoretic approach, we posit that the intervention of unaffected bystanders is a triggered normative response and show that generalized punishment norms survive in one of the two stable equilibria subject to selection drift.
Economics · Enforcement · Intervention (counseling) · Law and economics · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Norm (philosophy) · Normative · Political science · Punishment (psychology) · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Law · Psychology · Social Psychology
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,3 |
| Citation span | 2016 - 2018 (3) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |