Domestic Distributional Roots of National Interest

Bibliographic Data

ID3328111
AuthorsSoyoung Lee (0000-0002-3645-9281, Duke University, corresponding author)
Year2024
Volume118
Issue4
Pages1824-1839
Publication date2024-11-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueAmerican Political Science Review (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0003055423001284
OpenAlexW4390038421
LanguageEN
Citations received6
References cited72

What international issues become national interests worth fighting for, and why? Contrary to conventional wisdom, I argue that issues without clear economic value, such as barren lands, are more likely to be perceived as national interests because they do not benefit any single domestic group. Since who benefits is unclear, politicians have an easier time framing such issues as benefiting the whole nation. I test this argument using survey experiments on the American public. The results show that first, issues providing diffuse benefits to citizens are more likely to be considered national interests than issues providing concentrated benefits to certain domestic groups. Second, issues with clearer economic value are harder to frame as having diffuse benefits because they are more easily associated with specific beneficiaries. This study proposes a new theory of national interest and offers a potential explanation for why people frequently support conflict over issues without obvious benefits

Argument (complex analysis · Economics · Framing (construction · Geography · Law and economics · National interest · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Value (mathematics · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law