Undermining self-determination

Robert Murphy and the Atlantic Charter in Tunisia, 1943

Bibliographic Data

ID3979313
AuthorsMark Willis (0000-0002-3143-2207, corresponding author), Mark W Willis
Year2012
Volume17
Issue4
Pages595-630
Publication date2012-09-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Journal of North African Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1362-9387 • E-ISSN: 1743-9345
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/13629387.2012.685249
OpenAlexW2001139685
LanguageEN
References cited25

The liberation of Tunisia from the Axis military forces in 1943 provided the first concrete opportunity for the USA to apply the Atlantic Charter principle of self-determination. This article shows how the US diplomat Robert D. Murphy as presidential representative and political advisor to General Eisenhower quietly undermined key elements of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's policy towards the French and towards self-determination in North Africa. In contrast, the open dissension of another diplomat, Hooker Doolittle, with Murphy's policy of deference to the French on all matters concerning North Africa, including the brutal repression of the newly ‘liberated’ people of Tunisia, ignited a debate that reached the President himself. War-time imperatives, Murphy's superior bureaucratic tactics, and FDR's own ambivalence ensured that the Allied goal of self-determination remained a secondary consideration in North Africa. The episode throws new light on the development of US policy in North Africa during the Second World War, when decolonisation became a real policy option

Ambivalence · Bureaucracy · Cartography · Charter · Economic history · Geography · Political science · Politics · Presidential system · Summit · United Nations Charter · African history and culture studies · Historical and Contemporary Political Dynamics · Historical Studies and Socio-cultural Analysis · History · Law