The Paradox of Power

Bibliographic Data

ID5771677
AuthorsJack Hirshleifer (University of California, Los Angeles, corresponding author)
Year1991
Volume3
Issue3
Pages177-200
Publication date1991-11-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueEconomics and Politics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0954-1985 • E-ISSN: 1468-0343
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0343.1991.tb00046.x
OpenAlexW2063512294
LanguageEN
Citations received103
References cited15

In power struggles, the strong might be expected to grow ever stronger and the weak weaker still. But in actuality, poorer or smaller combatants often end up improving their position relative to richer or larger ones. This is the paradox of power. The explanation is that initially poorer contenders are rationally motivated to fight harder, to invest relatively more in conflictual activity. Only when the decisiveness of conflict is sufficiently high does the richer side gain relatively in terms of achieved income. Among other things, the paradox of power explains political redistributions of income from the rich to the poor

Position (finance · Agricultural Economics and Policy · Agricultural risk and resilience · Income, Poverty, and Inequality