When Governments Regulate Governments

Bibliographic Data

ID6231636
AuthorsDavid M Konisky (0000-0002-1146-3938, Indiana University), Manuel P Teodoro (0000-0002-1711-857X, Texas A&M University)
Year2016
Volume60
Issue3
Pages559-574
Publication date2016-07-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueAmerican Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/ajps.12221
OpenAlexW2153057815
LanguageEN
Citations received43
References cited35

This article advances a political theory of regulation that accounts for the choices of regulators and regulated entities when both are governments. Leading theories of regulation assume that governments regulate profit‐maximizing firms: Governments set rules, to which firms respond rationally in ways that constrain their behavior. But often the entities that governments regulate are other governments. We argue that government agencies and private firms often face different compliance costs, and that agencies have greater incentives than firms to appeal regulations through political channels. Simultaneously, the typical enforcement instruments that regulators use to influence firm behavior may be less effective against governments. Our empirical subjects are public and private entities’ compliance with the U.S. Clean Air Act and Safe Drinking Water Act. We find that, compared with private firms, governments violate these laws significantly more frequently and are less likely to be penalized for violations

Appeal · Business · Compliance (psychology · Economics · Enforcement · Government (linguistics · Incentive · Market economy · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Safe Drinking Water Act · Law · Legal and Constitutional Studies · Public Policy and Administration Research · Regulation and Compliance Studies