Ideological Distance between Candidates
An Empirical Examination
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6231986 |
|---|---|
| Authors | John L Sullivan (0000-0002-4676-1898), Daniel Richard Minns |
| Year | 1976 |
| Volume | 20 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 439 |
| Publication date | 1976-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2110682 |
| OpenAlex | W2334412094 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 22 |
| References cited | 8 |
In An Economic Theory of Democracy, Anthony Downs posits his theory of ideological choice. This theory states that political parties, in a rational effort to maximize votes and win elections, will generally attempt to match candidate ideological opinion with the distribution of ideological opinion in the electorate. To test some implications of this theory, we use the 435 congressional districts and the 32 states holding elections in 1966 as the units of analysis. The dependent variable, ideological distance between party candidates, is operationalized using a scale which distinguishes the liberalism-conservatism of the candidates. The independent variable, ideological opinion distribution in the districts and states, is operationalized by using a computer simulation. Results are analyzed with analysis of variance techniques. We find that candidate ideological divergence and convergence has a pattern contrary to Downs's analysis. Furthermore, these results are the same for both the state and congressional district levels. Downs's theory is then reformulated, and some confirmation is offered for
Conservatism · Convergence (economics · Democracy · Divergence (linguistics · Economics · Epistemology · Ideology · Liberalism · Linguistics · Operationalization · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Restrictiveness · Sociology · Variance (accounting · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Media Influence and Politics
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| Unique citing works | 22 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,46 |
| Citation span | 1978 - 2025 (48) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 22 |