Mutual Optimism and War, and the Strategic Tensions of the July Crisis
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6232007 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Alexandre Debs (0000-0002-3114-490X, Yale University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 66 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 271-284 |
| Publication date | 2022-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ajps.12569 |
| OpenAlex | W3095347895 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 7 |
| References cited | 57 |
Is mutual optimism a rationalist explanation for war? Countries are mutually optimistic if they have incompatible beliefs about the balance of power. Private information may fuel such beliefs, but it is unclear how rational countries could maintain incompatible beliefs if favorable information motivates a decision to fight, once countries incorporate their understanding of equilibrium strategies and later observe their enemy's decision to fight. I show that if countries have multiple reasons to fight—a favorable signal about the balance of power and a high resolve for the issue in dispute—then rational enemies can hold incompatible beliefs about the balance of power because an enemy's preference for war may not come from a favorable signal. Rational countries may even celebrate such an announcement, if it helps justify their own decision to fight. I discuss the implications of this argument for the causes of the First World War
Adversary · Argument (complex analysis · Balance (ability · Computer security · Economics · Keynesian economics · Law and economics · Management · Microeconomics · Optimism · Political economy · Political science · Positive economics · Power (physics · Preference · Private information retrieval · Rational expectations · Rational planning model · Computer Science · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Psychology · Religion and Society Interactions · Social Psychology
Overconfidence and War
In the Shadow of Power
The Causes of War
Between Peace and War
War and Punishment
Nuclear Deterrence Theory
Military Threats
Information, trade and common knowledge
Agreeing to Disagree
Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
Resolve in International Politics
History and Strategy
Reputation for Resolve
Raymond Poincaré
The Russian Origins of the First World War
Germany and the "Short-War" Illusion
The Schlieffen Plan Reconsidered
The Costs of Conversation
Defensive Realism and the “New” History of World War I
Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984
The New History of World War I and What It Means for International Relations Theory
The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War
Shifting power, preventive logic, and the response of the target
Cooperation under the Security Dilemma
An Economic Theory of War
Divergent Beliefs in “Bargaining and the Nature of War
The Common Priors Assumption
Bargaining and the Nature of War
Circumstances, Domestic Audiences, and Reputational Incentives in International Crisis Bargaining
Complicating Commitment
Mapping the Boundaries of Elite Cues
Revisiting Reputation
Cooperation, Conflict, and the Costs of Anarchy
Rationalist explanations for war
Talking While Fighting
Information, Uncertainty, and War
A Bargaining Model of War and Peace
Bargaining in the Shadow of War
Bargaining and Learning While Fighting
Mutual Optimism as a Rationalist Explanation of War
The Political Costs of Crisis Bargaining
Mutual Optimism and War
How Do Observers Assess Resolve
Public Finance and National Security
Pearl Harbor
Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes
| Unique citing works | 7 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,75 |
| Citation span | 2022 - 2026 (5) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 7 |