The godfather provides

Enduring corruption and organizational hierarchy in the Kenyan police service

Bibliographic Data

ID6264635
AuthorsNjoroge Mutahi, Makena Micheni (0000-0002-5892-7322, London School of Economics London UK, corresponding author), Milli Lake (0000-0002-5915-7374, London School of Economics London UK)
Year2023
Volume36
Issue2
Pages401-419
Publication date2023-04-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueGovernance (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0952-1895 • E-ISSN: 1468-0491
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/gove.12672
OpenAlexW4210800144
LanguageEN
Citations received11
References cited45

Despite government commitments to mitigate corruption and strengthen mechanisms of accountability in state security sectors, reform efforts frequently fail to curb illegal practices by state agents. Scholars offer explanations that range from deeply embedded societal norms of appropriate behavior to rational accounts emphasizing the individualized benefits corruption can offer. Using a case study of the Service Standing Orders in Kenya's National Police Service however, we build on the work of Persson et al.'s analysis to show how corrupt practices on the part of street‐level agents are reinforced within organizational hierarchies, through institutionalized—rather than personalized—incentives and obligations. As a result, policy innovations that do not explicitly identify the countervailing incentives created through internal command structures are likely to miss potentially fruitful avenues for institutional reform

Accountability · Business · Economics · Government (linguistics · Hierarchy · Incentive · Language change · Law and economics · Market economy · Political science · Public relations · Service (business · State (computer science · Work (physics · Corruption and Economic Development · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Public Administration · Marketing